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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The increase of labor relations has given use to troublesome problems
of supremacy and accommodation between state and federal laws.

Prior to

1935 there was little labor relations law other than the judge-made law of
strikes and picketing.

The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 1 guarantee

employees the rights of self-organization and collective bargaining whenever
their denial would "affec(f interstate commerce; it also provided procedures
for resolving disputes as to the identity of employees' representatives. The
broad interpretation which the Supreme Court placed upon the term "affectin
commerce" carried federal authority into fields traditionally subject to state
regulation, producing inevitable conflict as soon as state legislatures also
passed "baby Wagner Actsff dealing with employer unfair labor practices and
questions of employee representation.

Then, in 1947 the full panop.ied en-

1
National Labor Relations Act, 1935. 49 Stat. 499 (1935), 29 U. S. C.
8151 (1&46).

1

2

trance of tbe federal government iato the field of labor relatiotUS through the
enactment of the Labor- Management Relations Act of 1947 2 has opened a

Pandora t S box of jurisdictional complexities that bid well to occupy the re'"
sources of both federal and state courts for some considerable time. In
other words, in 1947 the area of overlapping legislation was enlarged by

enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act. Theretofore only the states had sought
to deal by law with the problems of strikes, picketing and other concerted
activities; and they bad consistently applied their laws to industries also

COY

ered by the NLRA. Therefore, the Taft .. Hartley amendments listing union
unfair labor practices superimposed federal regulation upon the existing

body of state law.

Much the same is true of the provisions dealing with in-

ternal wUon affairs, the settlement of labor disputes, and the terms and en...

torcem.ent of collective bargaining agreements.
Tho resulting problems of supremacy and accommodation are essential
ly ballea of legislative pollcy. The reach of federal power under the comm
clause is broad enough to permit Congress to make regulation of labor rela ...
tiona the exclusive province of the National Government. It 1s no less clear

2Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29
8141-197 (Supp. 1952).

u. S.

•
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that Congress may permit the states to exercise le,islative power over employer practices and employee activities without relard for their effect upon
interstate commerce, either alone or concurrently with federal regulation.
Ideally, therefore, Congress should c1raw the lines between (1) matters
which are to be subjects of exclusive national regulation. (2) matters which
are to be regulated by the federal .overnment but are also open to state regulation and (3) matters which are to be left to the states. However, Conerel
has not done this in the past but instead leaves the decision to the Supreme
Court. And the Court, paradoxically, then draws the necessary 11nes by
askin, - in form, it not actually - where Congress drew them. In view of
the refusal of Congress to delimit the labor relations field, the scope and

variety of the jurisdictional problema presented by the Act wID surely increase. The reasons lor this are numerous - the vastne. s of the fielcl
contemplated by the Act. definitions relating to commerce; the comprehensiveness of the regulations contrived by Congressional in,enutty; and lastly,
and most important. the resolute determination which many state courtshav
manileated to retain and exercise their control in labor controversies, particularly over the injunctive processes in labor litigation. Therefore, the
fact that the federal regulations, though numerous and comprehensive, are
spelled out with the minimum of specificity required by the rules controlling
the drafting of atatutes, has provided a germinating bed for the creation

ot

4

ever new jurisd.ictional problems because state courts have generally shown

i

a tendency to retain their power in this field. If the past history of equity
courts in this field, as demonstrated by their exercise of the combined law
making, law interpreting, and law enforcing functions, is any indication of
what the future may present, one can anticipate an ever growing multipl1c:at1c
of an infinite variety of new judicial improvisations to provide an area for
such judicial action free from the paramount federal power. Thus, the importance of this problem is easily seen. If this problem is not cleared up
quickly. chaos will result not only within our Government system but also be
tween Management and Labor. The two forces are far enough apart now. but
will become even farther apart if this problem becomes more acute.
The purpose of this thesis will not be to formulate an hypothesis and
then to draw concrete conclusions. Such an attempt would be suicidal in a
field such as this. However, the purpose of this paper will be to analyze
some of the conflict between state and federal laws, primarily from the view
point of adjudication. and come to a tentative conclusion on which side of the
line, e.

a.

federal or state, actual jurisdiction falls.

The problem of this thesis is, the author believes, clear. We know that
a State cannot regulate what the federal government has lawfully chosen to
regulate. In other words, when there is at federally protected right. a state
court cannot be allowed to grant an injunction and thus detract or destroy the

I
r1
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federally protected right.

However, even here .. there is a difference be-

tween a state court granting an injunction and providing money damages.

We

shall see, that one will run directly counter to the NLRA. while the other
will not run counter to the Act.

However, what about those things which

Congress has shown no intention to regulate or with which the Act does not
specifically deal, even though it deals with the field in which that specific
conduct Is?

Here one meets head on with the problem. For example.. sup-

pose that a state labor relations act were amended to make it an unfair la.bor
practice to fail to include in a collective bargaining agreement some provision for the final settlement of disputes over its interpretation and application.
Strictly speaking# Congress has not sought to govern the conduct of employees and unions with respect to the inclusion of such a clause, nor has it manifested any intention beyond that of leaving the parties free tram federal
compulsion in negotiating the terms of their agreements. Whether enforcement of the supposed state law would actually thwart any legislative or ad..
ministrative policy of the federal government is entirely speculative, yet one
may pred1ct with some assurance that the supposed state law would be held
inapplicable to industrieS subject to the NLRA. The reason is that although
voluntary incorporation of such a clause Is generally regarded as sound polley, for the court to permit a state to require its inclusion would involve an
undue risk of interference with the basic policy of free negotiation underlying

6

the NLRA.
As can be seen, there is a definite problem and when this is coupled
with the problem of l'potemial conflict" and of an attempt to find out the true

intention of Congress, one encounters many difficulties. .An attempt will be
made to solve such difficulties without trying to come to concrete and definite
conclusions.

This does not mean that when this paper is finished the reader

will be "1eft up in the air.

Ii

On tr..e contrary. there will be a conclusion

drawn after analyzing the cases. But this does not mean that the author will
come to a conclusion saying everything is "whitet! and therefore nothing can
be "black".

Therefore, in summary. before entering into the text proper of this
thesis, the author would like to restate the problem clearly and concisely so

we know what we must try to solve.

The root of the problem is imbedded in

the principle that state regulation is excluded from any field of activity

where Congress, in accordance with its constitutional authority, has shown its
intention to regulate and in which it has not affirnlatively provided for state
regulation.

Then from here one goes on to the fact that there is

0.

peripheral

area about each of the exact prohibitions of the N:::""H.t'.. into which the states
may not intrude without federal authorization.
defining that area.

The real problem is one of

In other words, is the failure of Congress to proscribe

certain conduct an indication that the federal policy is to permit the conduct

7

without interference from anyone, or is this evidence of a willingness to
leave the issue to the states? It will be the purpose of this paper to clear up
these troublesome perplexities and to throw light on some possible solutions,
and to bring agreement where there has been disagreement.

CHAPTER II
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROBLEM - THE
PRINCIPLE OF PRE-EMPTION AND
THE ilSUPHEMACY CLAUSE"
In examining problems of federal-state jurisdiction in the field of labor

relations the fact is sometimes overlooked that these problems spring from
the distribution of governmental power in our federal system; that similar
problems arise in virtually every field of federal

re~.:ilation;

and that the

problems are not intrinsically Hlabor relations" problemo at all.

The doc-

trines which the Supreme Court has applied in its labor relation cases which

have raised federal-state jurisdiction issues have a history far older than
Congress' first attempts to regulate labor relations under the "Commerce
Clause!l.

Examination of that history may help to explain the cases which

the writer will delve into further on in this paper and ffiCiY afford a clue to
the resolution of the numerous issues of federal- state jurisdiction in the

labor l"elations field which remain unsettled.
It was decided early in our constitutional history that the llCommerce

Clause ':. standing alone, does not bar state regulation of activities of predominantly local concern.. where nationwide uniformity of regulation is not
8

9

imperative, even though the activities involve or affect interstate commerce.
However. at the same time, it was decided that the affirmative grant to Congress of power to regulate interstate commerce, coupled with the federal
"Supremacy Clause", enabled Congress to close the door completely to
state regulation even in these areas. In other words, it was decided that if
Congress was to carry out those express powers granted to it by the Constitution, it should also be able to take steps to effectuate those express powers - the means to obtain the end.
From these first principles it followed that the fate of state regulation
in areas which Congress was empowered to regulate rested entirely upon the
will of Congress. VJhere Congress clearly manifested its intention either to

permit or to preclude state regulation. nothing remained for the courts but
to give effect to that Congressional policy. But what were the courts to assume when. as frequently happened, Congress, while undertaking to regulate
a field which the states had previously been free to regulate, manifested no
intention with respect to the survival of state regulatory powers. and where,
indeed. there was no evidence that Congress had even considered the problem?
This issue was squarely met by the Supreme Court for the first time in

10
Houston v. Moore.3 There, Mr. Justice Washington speaking for the Court,
took occasion to repudiate what he described as the "novel and unconstitutional doctrine, that in cases where the State governments have a concurrent
power of legislation with the National Government, they may legislate upon
any subject on which Congress has acted, provided the two laws are not in
terms_ or in their operation, contradictory and repugnant to each other. II
The heart of the matter, as the Court saw it, 1s that when Congress undertakes to legislate on a· subject it must be presumed that its regulations go as
far as Congress "thought right." Therefore, state regulation which goes further. even though in the same direction, is necessarily incompatible with
Congress' jud,ment as to how far the regulation should go. This is true even
though it be conceded that "important provisions have been omitted, or that
others which have been made might have been more extended, or more wisely
devised. II Thus, if the federal law and the state law U correspond in every respect, then the latter is idle and inoperative; if they dUfer, they must, in the
nature of things, oppose each other, so far as they do dUfer. If the one impos
es a certain punishment, for a certain offense, the presumption is that this
was deemed suffiCient, and under all circumstances. the only proper one.

3Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 20-23 (1820).
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If the other legislature imposes a different punishment, they cannot both

consist harmoniously together. 't
Since Congress presumably did not intend to sanction such opposition,
t~

will of Congress "is to be discovered as well by what the legislature has

not declared. as by what they have expressed. II
This presumption - that the enactment ot legislation by Congress renects its considered judgment as to what substance and form regulation of a
particular subject should take - remains to this day the cornerstone of the
so-called "pre-emption". or "occupation of the field" doctrine. It has been
reiterated through the years by some of the most illustrious Justices who
have sat on the Supreme Court.
Mr. Justice Holmes' classic restatement of the principle for a unanimous Court in the Varnville Company Case" 1s illustrative. "When Congress has taken the particular subject"matter in hand, coincidence is as ineffective as oppOSition, and a state law is not to be declared a help because
it attempt.s to go farther than Congress has seen fit to go." And in 1926 .. Mr.

Justice Butler, also speaking for a unanimous Court, struck down a state
law regulating liability of railroads for loss of property on the ground that,

4Charleston &. Carolina Railroad v. Varnville Companz, 237 U. S. 604
(1915).

12
"Congress must be deemed to have determined that the rule laid down and
the means provided to enforce it are sufficient and that no other regulations
are necessary. Its power to regulate such commerce 1s supreme; and as
that power has been exerted, state laws have no application.

They cannot

be applied in coincidence with. as complementary to, or as in opposition to,

Federal enactments which disclose the intention of Congress to enter a
field of regulation that Is within its jurisdiction. !l5
Thus, in a "nut-shell'f, the "pre-emption)! doctrine rests upon the assumption that in regulating a subject within its constitutional powers. Congress goes as far as it thinks necessary and proper. Supersedure of state
legislative power in the regulated field is therefore necessary to preserve
the integrity of Congress' judgment that the rights and remedies which it
provides are sufficient. The consequence is that by virtue of the "Supremacy Clause", state law which either duplicates. complements or supplements
CongreSSional regulation must fall.
Therefore, as can be seen, the "Supremacy Clause II enters into the
labor relations area as it did in the commerce area.

:\s the llSupremacy

Clausell gave the Federal Government priority itl the field of commerce by

5Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v • Porter, 273 U. S. 345- 346(1926)
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expanding the area over which the Federal Government had control. so it

has given the Federal Government more power to deal with labor relations
by enhancing and giving more power and meaning to the I'pre-emption" doctrine. Whether this is a valid extension of Federal control or an usurpation
of State's Rights remains to be seen. The answer to this can only be gotten
through analyses of relevant Supreme Court decisions.

CHAPTER III
PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE NLRA AND
THEIR APPLICATION

Before going any further in this paper it would be wise to examine those
provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 which touch on the
subject of state jurisdiction. Reference to state action and jurisdiction are
to be found in sectiol'lS 8(d), 10(a), 13. 14(a) and 14(b) of Title I, whieh enacts
an amended National Labor Relations Act, in section 203(b) of Title II and in
section 303 of Title W. Seetion 8(d) eontemplates that the parties to a contract modification or termination dispute shall. among other things, give noUcE
thereot to the State mediation agency, it any. Section 10(a) provides that the
power of the National Labor Relations Board to preve nt unfair labor practices
under the amended NLRA shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment but authorizes the board to "cede If jurisdiction. subject to eertain limitations, to state agencies. Section 13 provides, among other things, that the Act
is not intended to affect any limitations or qualifications on the right to strike.
Section 14(a) says that no other law. national or local, shall operate to require employees subject to the federal act to give supervisors bargaining
14

15
rights. Section 14(b) expressly preserves state freedom to impose more
severe limitations on the use of union security than are contained in the federa! act. Section 203(b) directs the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service to stay out of minor disputes if state mediation is available. And section 303 provides for a damage remedy in the federal and state courts tor
injuries suffered as a result of secondary boycotts and other federally pro"
scribed kinds of union conduct.

It is Significant that none of these provisions contains a clear, compre ...
hensive delineation of the subject matter either pre-empted by Congress or
shared with the states.

The statute does not. like the Securities Act of

1933 6 , the Fair Labor standards Act

ot 1938 7• and the original United States

Warehouse Act 8 , give a clear green light to the states, nor on the other hand,
does it, like the Railway Labor Act, 9 fail to provide any signal at all. Rather,
it contains a kind of incomplete book of traffic rules, some specific, some

vague. Some lanes are clearly open to the states; others are as clearly

6SecuritiesAct, 1933. 48 stat. 74. 85 (1933). 15 U. S. c. 177 (1940)1'
7Fair Labor Standards Act. 1938. 52 Stat. 1069 (1938), 29 U.S.C. 1218
(1940).
8United States Warehouse Act. 39 Stat. 490(1916).
0Rallway Labor Act. 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended by 48 Stat. 926
(1934), 45 O. S. C. c. 8 (1940).
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closed. But many roads are umnarked, or marked with confusing signs,
making it necessary tor the traveler to rely upon some general compass
bearing in order to be able to proceed.
Some details of these provisions are clear_ others less clear, and still
others are altogether ambiguous. The discussion of these provisions will
be only to throw some knowledge on the sections of the Act which are rele-

vant to our discussion. At no time will the author discuss the wiseness or
unwiseness of congressional policy concerning these sections.

The purpose

of this discussion will not be to see if Congress waS wise in writing certain

provisions into the Act, but to try to make clear those provisions which can
be made clear. in hope of trying to make those more ambiguous sections

such as 10(a) a little more understandable to the reader, so that whel1 it
comes time to analyze the cases the reader will have a workable knowledge
of the very pertinent section 10(a).
Section 14(b) of the amended NLRA provides: "Nothing in this Act shall
be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any
State or Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by

State or Territorial law. "
The legislative history of this provision confirms what is apparent on

17

its face that Congress thereby desired to make clear its intent to leave the
states free to deal with union security provisions, provided state action is
not less restrictive than the federal act. It seems to me that the draftsmen
simply wanted to make sure that the uncertainty as to state authority which
existed under the original NLRA should not exist under the Act as amended.
The amended NLRA outlaws the closed shop as a form of discrimination, but
permits the union shop under certain conditioIl$. There is no question but
that the states are not bound to tolerate even the union shop. They may, it
they so desire, prohibit both the closed and the union shop. Or, they may
permit the union shop, but on conditions not less restrictive than those provided by the amended NLRA. This is true, of course l whether the state imposes the limitations by legislation or by judicial decision.
Section 14(a) of the amended NLRA operates, on the other hand, as an
absolute limitation on the authority of the states to require employees subject to the Act to accord bargaining rights to supervisory employees.

This

section reads: "Nothing herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a
supervisor from becoming or remaining a member of a labor organization

j

but no employer subject to this Act shall be compelled to deem individuals
defined herein as supervisors as employees for the purpose of any state law.
either national or local, relating to collective bargaining. It
By this provision Congress established a uniform, national policy with

18

respect to the bargaining rights of supervisory employees of employers
whose activities affect interstate commerce. The result is that the collective bargaining position of such employees is to be determined by the parties
themselves, not by law. This restores the situation to the status quo before
the orilinal NLRA.

Section 13 of the amended NLRA reads: "Nothing in the Act, except as

specifically provided tor herein. shall be construed so as either to intertere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect
the limitations or qualifications on that rllh!.

1/

(Underlining supplied)

The first part of this provision is irrelevant to our present problem.
The underlined portion may be pertinent. It may be read as leaving the
states free to impose such limitations on strike action as they shall deem to

be necessary. On the other hand, Congress may have sought by this section

only to leave unimpaired those indirect sanctions on improper strike action
which had been worked out in the form of a denial of the privileges of the

or1ginal NLRA in the Fansteel Case. to The legislative history shows that
the draftsmen had the latter purpose in mind# but it does not show whether

they regarded this as a minimum or maximum objective. 11 It is perhaps

lOFansteelMetallurS!calC0!'P. v. N.L.R.B q

306U. S. 240 (1939).

11Senate Report No. 105# Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. 80th
Congress. 1st Session, April 17. 1947. p. 28.
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not unreasonable to suggest. however. that if at this point they were think ...
ing of the major problem of state restrictions on union conduct, they would
have been careful to use language which would lea.ve their intention clear.
On the whole one must put the section down as ambiguous, although a reason'"
able man could hardly be charged with negligence if he should take the sec"
tion at its face value and conclude that state power to deal with strikes remains unimpaired.
There is no question but that the states are left free to employ the techniques of mediation with respect to some categories, at least, of labor disputes involving employers subject to the LMRA. Section B(d) of the amended
NLRA requires that notice of contract termination or modification disputes

shall be given not only to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service,
but also to "any State or Territorial agency established to mediate and concUiate disputes. U And section 203(b) of Title II of the LMRA directs the
Federal Service lito avoid attempting to mediate disputes which would have
only a minor effect on interstate commerce if State or other conciliation
services are available to the parties. II These provisions are meaningful
only if it is intended that the State services shall be free to intervene at
least to the extent indicated. Thus. Congress did intend at least some state
mediation.
Section S03(b) of Title

m of the

LMRA provides a damage remedy in the

20

Federal District Courts and "in any other court having jurisdiction of the
parties H for violations of the provisions of Section 303(a) making unlawful
certain kinds of union collective action. This provision, of course, does not
per se shed light on the problem the author is considering, but it does serve
to indicate that Congress did not intend to set up an exclusive system of federal remedies.
These are the sections which in some way deal with the problem. It is
true that the jurisdictional problem is not directly taken up in any of the se
provisions. However. a small explanation of these provisions was necessary
before discussing Section 10(a), which 1s concerned with the problem very
deeply. These were the proviSions where one can find some basis for
reaching a conclusion on the meaning of the sections, and which will at least
indirectly help us to give meaning to the very pertinent provision in Section
10(a), whose discussion deserves a chapter in itself, for here is where the
"heart" of the problem lies.

CHAPTER IV
THE MEANING OF SECTION IO(A) -

THE

"HEART" OF THE PROBLEM

The most"importa:1t and latently ambiguous of the specific retert&l'v:es in
the LMRA to atate action is that contained in Section 10(a) of the amended

NLRA, which provides:
The Board is empowered. as hereinafter provided, to prevent
any person from enga,ina in any unfair labor practice (listed in
section 8) affecting commerce. This power shall not be affected
by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or
may be established by agreement. law Qr otherwise: Provided,
That the Board is empowered by ap"eement with any agency of
any State or Territory to cede to such agency jurisdiction over
any eases in any industry (other than m1Dina~ manuiactur1n&
communications. and transportation except where predominantly
locuin character) even thouJh such ca.e. may involve labor dis"
putes affectin, commerce, unless the prOvisions of the ::.'tate or
Territorial statute appUcable to the determination of such cases
by such agency is inconsistent with tile corresponding provision
of this Act or has received a construction inconsistent therewith.
It will be observed that the National Labor Relations Board is given ex"
press authority to "cede" jurisdiction over any cases at which it has jurisdicion under the amended NLRA subject to two exceptions. First. it may not
~o so if the applicable portion of the atate statute is inconsistent with the

ederal act. Second, it may not do so in any event in the mining, manuiactur-

21
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ing. communications or transportation fields unless the situation can be
brought within the "predominantly local in character" category.

There is

some doubt whether this latter category is to be determined by reference to
the industry (the employer) or to the particular case, but the legislative

record makes it fairly clear that the criterion is the character of the employ...
er's operations, not the nature of the case. 12
There are several possible constructions or meanings which may be
given to section 10(a). First. it may be contended that Congress thereby indicated its intention to pre-empt completely the fields of regulation entered
by the amended NLRA. with the follOWing exceptions: (1) the Case of minor

industries to the extent that jurisdiction is specifically and properly ceded by
the NLRB; (2) the reservation to the states made in sections 13 and 14; and
(3) 8.n implied reservation of state power to protect person and property
against acts of violence.

To attach this meaning to section 10(a) would mean

that the police power of the states is suspended as to employer and union interferences with the right ot self--organization and as to union collective
action except to the extent that jurisdiction is expressly ceded by the NLRE
as to local industries, and except to impose restrictions on the use of union

12 House Report, No. 510, Conference Committee, 80t.h Congress. 1st
Session. June 3, 1947, p. 52.
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security provisions. to preserve the peace and. possibly, to impose general
limitations on the "right" to strike. The word "possibly" as to restrictions
\

on strike action is used advisedly, sinc., if this construction should be
placed upon section 10(a), the ambiguity in section 13 might very well be resolved against the existence of state power.
At the other extreme it may be contended that Congress did not, by
section 10(a). intend to indicate pre-emption in any respect. but only to give
express approval to the practice already started by the Board under the
original NLRA of making practical, working arrangements with state boards
under which persons interested could be clear as to the jurisdiction of state
boards to enforce under state laws, as to certain designated industries,
policieS comparable with those of the federal act.

Under this view the ques-

tion of the applicability of state labor relations legislation and common law
would be determined in the light of the general principles concerning implied
supersedure of state authority which have been used by the Supreme Court.
As will be seen, these concepts are sufficiently flexible to permit the Court
to conclude that the states are free to enforce regulations additional to and
not inconsistent with those of the federal act. and even regulating comparable
with those of the lederal act. at least so long as the National Board has not
acted in the case.
A third meaning that may be given to section lO(a) is that Congress in

24

section lOla) indicated its intention to pre-empt the field as to the major
industries, subject to certain express or implied exceptions, but not to preempt the field at all as to minor industries.

The exceptions would be the

following: (1) any subject matter not touched by the amended NLRA, (2) the
implied authority of the states to preserve the peace, and (3) types of regulations expressly reserved to state authority by sections 13 and 14 of
act.

thr~

A possible variant of this interpretation, and hence a fourth meaning

that may he attached t.o section 10(1.1), 1s that Congress intended to exclude
all state regulation in the field of management -- union relations. subject,
of course, to exceptions (2) and (3) above, even as to subject matter not
touched by the lederal statute. but to leave the states free to act with respect
to minor industries.
The writer thinks that it is fairly cognizable that each of these construc·
tions of section 10(1.1) is possible. However, does anyone of them harmonize
more than the others with the general purposes and other relevant provisions
of the Act? There is in the author's opinion no
question.

conclusi~

answer to this

The first construction - pre-emption - would render section 14(a)

dealing with supervisory employees, redundant. but would give pOint to sections 13 and 14(b), as well as to section 8(d) - that is, these provisions woulcl
be necessary if Congress intended, despite general pre-emption. to leave the
states free to act in certain cases.

The second construction - no pre· emptio ,
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at all - would render section 14(0) and, to some extent section 13. super"
fluous aud, what is more important. would leave the State boards incongruously free to act even with respect to the major industries while permitting
the National Board to !!cede'! Jurisdiction only with respect to the minor io-

dustries. The third construction -- pre-emption, with exceptions. as to the
major industries; no pre-emption as to others - would give meaning to sections 8(d), 13, and 14(b), as exceptions to general pre-emption in the case of
the major industries, as well as meaning to section 14(a) &s establishing

ill

uniform national policy with respect to supervisory employees even in the
minor industries. The fourth construction - pre-emption. with exceptions,
as to the major industries even to the point of excluding regulation as to
matters not touched by the federal act; no pre-emption as to the minor indus ...
tries - would yield like results in making other provisions of the act meaningful, but would rest on the dubious assumption that Congress intended to
supersede the state police power completely as to management-union rela·
tions in the major industries except for those matters specifically reserved.
On the whole the third and fourth constructions most consistently coordiru.'l.te

with the other specific references in the act to state action. but this fact is
probably not conclusive.

The determination of the existence or non-existence

of state power should not hang on so slender a thread a.s section lO(a) being
construed the way which comes closest to giving meaning to the other pro-

(
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visions in the act.
Thus, the author will take up the legislative history of section 10(a) to
make its meaning clearer and therefore have a stronger basis on which to
ii"

draw our conclusions on the issue ot state freedom of action under the NLBA

:I!

versus the limitation necessary to secure full effectiveness of national poU-

!I
i

cies.
In studying the short legislative history of section 10(a) one would have

to come to the conclusion that on its face Concress intended a construction
of section 10(a) which would deny to the states jurisdiction of the subject
matter touched by the amended NLRA except as otherw1ae expressly provided.
This contention is supported by the pertinent portions of the Report of the
House Committee on Education and Labor on section 10(a) which provided:
"The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to adjudicate comI

plaints of unfair labor practices affectin, commerce filed by the Administrator. Such power of the Board shall be exclusive. ,,13
The Committee indicated that it thought the Itexelusive jurisdiction"
which would thereby be ,iven to the board necessitated a special provision
giving the states tt a concurrent jurisdiction in respect of closed shop and
other union security arrangements", and it referred to the act as an "illus- .

-----.--------------13Bouae Report, No. 245, Committee on Education and Labor, 80th
Congress, 1st Session, April 11, 1947, p. 57.

27
tration" of the policy calling for uniformity in "matters ot national policy under the commerce clause. II The Committee further stated that "since by the
Labor Act Congress pre-empts the field that act covers in so far as commerce within the meaning of the act is concerned. the saving provision was
necessary.lt14
The Senate Committee Report of section 10(a) which was substantially
in the form finally incorporated in the Act, 10 referred to the section briefiy
to say that the proviso was added to permit the NLRB "to allow State laborrelations boards to take final jurisdiction of cases in border-line industries
(that

is~

border-line insofar as interstate commerce is concerned), provid-

ed the State statute conforms to national policy." The Conference Report
makes it apparent that the Conference Committee accepted the Senate's version of the first part of section 10(a) in order to make it clear that the damage and injunction proviSions of the LMRA, while depriving the NLRB of
exclusive jurisdiction, would not operate to cut off the administrative remedy. This latter point to the author's mind at first seemed contradictory.
However, a closer look at the words used made things clear. The reason
the words were changed from "exclusive to "not be affected by other means
I.

14lbid., pp. 40, 44.
10House Report, No. 510, Conference Committee, 80th Congress. 1st
SeSSion, June 3, 1947. p. 52.
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of adjustment or prevention", was to allow the Board to ttcede" jurisdiction
which comes in the proviso in section 10(a). The words in the final analysis
give the same result. But the latter allows the Board to cede jurisdiction
where the Board is overburdened with work while the tormer would leave
the Board in the embarrassing position of 'biting off more than it can chew. \I
Neither this Report nor the Senate Committee Report made reference to
the problem of state jurisdiction absent a specific cession of jurisdiction by
the NLRB.

This failure to discuss the problem of concurrent state jurisdic-

tion in reference to the Senate Bill leaves the intentions of the draftsmen in
some doubt. But it must be conceded, in view of the House Committee's
statement, that there is somewhat more in the record against than in favor of
a construction which would permit the states to act, as to matters touched by
the federal act, either in the case of major industries, or, independently of

cession of jurisdiction, in the case of minor industries.
Thus, it would seem that the fourth construction - Congress intended to
exclude all state regulation in the field of management-union relations. subject to the exceptions of the impUed authOrity of the states to preserve the
peace and types of regulations expressly reserved to state authority by sections 13 and 14 of the act, even as to subject matters not touched by the federal statute, but to leave the states free to act with respect to minor industries - would be the most apt one tor the environment of the legislative his-
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tory which surrounds it. However. at the same time note should again be
taken of the ambiguity of section 10(a). It can be argued that if Congress had
intended to suspend the operation of the state police power in the field of management-union relations. except as otherwise expressly provided or

a~

neces

sarily implied, it would seem that clear language to this end would have been
used in view of the importance of the result. No valid answer can be given
to this contention by any writer who c()ncerns himself with the issue of Federal .. State jurisdiction. This is a matter tor the courts to interpret and decide. For it 1s through court decisions that meaning Is given to our laws.
And even here where there Is ambiguity, not all of the judges will give the
same meaning to section 10(a). This problem the reader shall soon see when
he comes to the chapter analyzing the pertinent cases on this subject matter.

For the present, the author will look to the intent of Congress that is manifested under the entire ft ct.

CHAPTER V
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT UNDER THE NLRA AS AMENDED

Since we have discussed the intent of Congress in relation to Section
10(a). in order to give a meaning to that section, the writer thinks it wise to
inquire into the intent of Congress under the entire Act. In tbis way the
reader will have some idea what Congress meant when it legislated this Act.
This knowledp of Congressional intent will make for a better understanding
of the cases because it is the fashion of recent cases to treat the "intent of
Congress" as the controlling consideration in determining what state regulation bas been superseded by federal law.
Before delving into the legislative history of the Act. the author will

COIl·

cern himself with the philosophy and usefulness of Congressional intent. The
phrase Itintent of Congress" may be a helpful reminder of the duty of judges
to decide questions of pre-emption from the standpoint of one who approves
not only the SUbstantive federal policy but also the substance of the state law
$0

far as not plainly inconsistent with the former, rather than according to

"personal views" about the substantive policies embodied in the legislation.
Some of the opinions of our learned judges, however, seem to use the expression as if Congress had a specific intention with respect to each issue
30
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of pre-emption which it is the Court's function to divine. A concrete example of this can be found in International Union v. Wisconsin Empl0l!D:ent Relations Bd.. 16 where the Court stated: "We therefore turn to its legislation
for evidence that Congress has clearly manifested an exclusion of the state
power sought to be exercised in this case. II Where there is convincing evidence of a specific Congressional intent, as there is In many sections of the
NLRA. it surely should be followed, though it may seem unwise. But such
an inquiry Is frequently Ulusory. Congress rarely consid!rs controversial
issues of labor policy in terms of the problems oftederaliom.
It has sometimes been assumed that a specific intent to leave room for
state regulation can be discerned in the faUure of a statute to deal spectfi..

cally with the particular conduct that the state wishes to control. Thus, Mr.
Justice Jackson bas reasoned that a state was tree to police particular em ...
ployee activities despite federal refUlation of other employee

co~duet

in the

same field, "because the Federal Board has no authority either to investigate, approve or forbid ••• the conduct in question. Ifl" Whatever the mer-

16International Union v. Wisconsin EmEloyJ.'I!ent Relations
245. 253·(1949).

84 ' 336

U. s.
I

1".Ibid•• p. 254.

'I

I;
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ts of the p::trticub.r case, the suggested test is rarely useful because the
'allure of Congress to deal with a specific course of conduct in an area. over
which a large measure of federal control has been exercised is as likely to
ndicate that Conaress intended to leave such con.duct free from regulati.;):!
as that Congress intended to leave freedom of action to the atates.

The dif-

iculty is best illustrated by the problem of accommodating state and federal
fl.WS

regu1atini strikes for

~art1ey

reco~nit1on

and bargaining rights. The Taft-

amendments impose two restrictions upon concerted action aimed at

~(}curing

recognition as bargaining

representative~

Section 8(b)(4)(B) de-

I!lares it to be an unfair labor practice tor a labor organization to induce the
~mployees

of one employer to refuse to handle goods or render services for

fbe purpose of forcing another employer to recognize an uneertifiod labor .
~rganizat1oll
~(b)(4)(C)

as the bargaining representative of his employees. Section

declares concerted economic action unfair when Us purpose il to

orca "any employer to recognize or bariain with a particular labor organiation as the representative of his employees if another labor organization
8.S

been certified as the representative of $uch employees under the provia-

ons of Section 9. tI
Now a number ot states have replated organizational activities along
cifferent Unes. In California strikes and picketina appear to be unlawful

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. . . 1:1:1

.-

I'
1

!

I
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whenever two unions are competing tor recognition. 18 New York 19 and

iill
'I

II

,II
Ii

Massachusetts 20 have taken the view that n. minority uni.on should not be allowed to invoke economic pressures after the employees have voted in a
labor board election. Pennsylvania has attempted to forbid all stranger
picketing

21

and Florida 22 all minority strikes for recognition.

It is lutile to attempt to extract trom Section 8(b) evidence of a consclous Congressional desire either to exclude or to permit these forms of
state regulation. The fact that Congress proscribed only some organization-

al strikes may indicate only that there is no national policy opposed to other
strikes aimed at securinl recognition or bargaining rights. Yet Congress
considered the whole field of organizational activities and apparently felt no
inhibition against excluding state regulation. Consequently. it seems just as
reasonable to suppose that Section 8(b) does not restrict the conduct covered
by the California, New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and Florida laws

18C alifornia Labor Code. 111115-1118 (Supp. 1950).

1
19Loevin ARparel Shops v. Harlem Union, 24 LRRM 2567 (1948); Wlnst
Radio Corp. v. Levine, 25 LRRM 2478 (1950).
20Massachusetts Annotated Laws, 150A, 14(3)(c) (1949).
21Pennsylvania Statutes Annotate!:t Title 43, 1211.
~

22F l or ida Statutes Annotated. 1481.09(3) (1950) V
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because Congress concluded as a matter of substantive pollcy that it should
not be suppressed.
The difficulty with attempting to inquire into the intent of Congress on
the basis of either statutory prohibitions or for that matter legislativ·e history~

which is only clear as to some aspects of the Act, may also be Ulus-

trated by an example involving an employer unfair labor practice. Wisconsin makes it an unfair labor practice to violate an agreement to submit a
labor dispute to arbitration. 23 There is no similar provision in the NLRA.
The- silence of Congress might be taken to mean either that the subject was

lett to state control or that Congress believed such an enactment to be so
unwise that the regulation should not be imposed. Leaislative history in this
instance furnishes no assistance. When the Taft and Hartley bills were referred to the Conference Committee, both included provisions maJting it an
unfuir labor practice for an employer to violate the terms of a collective

bargaininl agreement. The Conference Report contained no similar provision. The House managers' explanation of the omission was that: HOnce the
parties bave made a collective bargainin, contract the enforcement of the
l

contract should be left to the usual processes of the law and not to the Nation-

23Wlscons1n Statutes. 111.06(2)(c) (1949).
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al Labor Relations Board." 24 The explanation may reneet either the distrust of the NLRB which was felt by many Congressmen or elae the desire
to relieve the Board of the burden involved in enforcement of such a provisioni in either event, it might be said. the defeat of this proposal does not
manitest an intention to deprive the states of power to determine the forum
in which collective bargaining agreements should be enfcrcad. Equally

strong arguments can be presented for

Iii

contrary conclusion. Some Con-

gressmen must have been aware of the prevailing opinion that enforcement
of collective bargaining agreements through labor relations boards would re'"
sult in the development of a different body of law and policy than could be
achieved through litigation in the courts. Should the reader not conclude
therefore that Congress preferred court enforcement to administrative hand...
Ung, whether by the Federal Government or the states?
If the test of consistency is not sufficient and some supposed specific

intent of Congress turns out to be a will-o'-the .. wisp, how then should one
decide What part of the field of labor relations Congress has pre'"'empted
against state control? Perhaps we must be content with T. R. Powell ts observaUon that the decisiOns turn on whether "the impediment of further state

24House Report, No. 510, Conterence Committee, 80th Congress, 1st
Session, June 3, 1947, p. 42.
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requirements is to be deemed a bane rather than a blessing. "25 Few would
question the sense of this commentary on judicial behavior. For many judges

I

there are strong temptations in any particularistic approach. It offers an
easy escape from the evUs of over-l8neralization and excessive reliance upon the lol1cal development of precedents. The judge who follows it may permit state intervention whenever he believes that Congress overlooked a sartous evil that the state bas dealt with wisely, or. if he holds the opinion that
the labor policy of the Federal Government is preferable to a particular state

law" he may find the field pre-empted against that kind of regulation. To be
sure_ judps cannot entirely eliminate their preferences among substantive
policies from their judgments upon issues of exclusive or concurrent control, yet surely such preferences should be pushed into the background as
far as possible by the development of other criteria. It is not the function of
judges to set aside or approve according to their notions of public labor policy laws adopted by the people of a state. In dec1din, questions ot preemptlo~

therefore. a court should accept the policy of the federal statute

and, in the absence of clear inconsistency.. should assume that the state leg...

islation is no less soundly conceived. The question of pollcy which the court
illi

JS T • R. Powell, "Current Contl1cts Between the Commerce Clause and

3t atc;' Police Power", l\'Ur:.ncsot~ 'Lr-w Rc_viev,r, XII (Oct. 1928), 607.
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has then to decide 15 whether from the standpoint of one interested in the development of the federal labor policy the state leJislation. however wise 1t
may be, is more

ot a bane than a blessinl.

In resolving this issue several lines of inquiry appear to be pertinent

in order to estabUsh criteria on which the judge can better give a decision
on a set of facts in a case. The chance of collision between federal and
state administrative agencies is an important factor to which the decisions
give great weight. But the danger that enforcement of a state regulation
will thwart the development of federal policy 1s not confined to L."lStances of

inconSistency on the face of the statutory provisions or in the exercise of
administrative discretion. It may result from permitting a state to regulate
specific conduct which Congress has left ungoverned although it Is part of

Ii

broader field ot activity over which Congress has asserted pnera! control.
In the latter case the U. S. Supreme Court haa declared void state regulations

as an undue risk ot interference with the basic policy of free negotiation under
lying the NLRA.
A second pertinent line of inquiry is into the desirabUity of avoiding too
fine a line of decision.

As Mr. Powell said, "The primary desideration is

to have a settled rule or dictate rather than to be sure that the legislative
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mind has been correctly divined. ,,26 The illustrations the author has already
drawn from state and tederal statutes regulating strikes and picketing re-

veal the problems that a particularistic approach to the delimitation of
state and federal authority would almoat surely create. It the validity of
each state law were decided ad hoc, endless litigation would be required;
meanwhile the litigants and all persons similarly situated would be left to
build a highly dellcate relationship upon shifting sands. There is merit in
extending to the whole field of labor relations Mr. Justice Douglas' admont..
tion that "the uncertainty as to which board is master and how long it will
remain such can be as disruptive of peace between various industrial factions as actual competition between two boarda for supremacy. 1137
F1naUy. the division of pubUc authority over industrial relations would

seem likely to discourage the development of an integrated public labor policy. This is an important consideration not only as it bears upon the devel ..
opment of administrative poliCieS but also from the standpoint ot further
legislation. The problema which arise during employee or.anIsation the
l

selection of a barlainiDi representative, the nelotiation of a series of col-

lectlve agreements and their day-to-day administration are all phases of a

-

26Ibid.. 831.

27LaCrosse. Tel. Corp. v. Wisconsin Eme10l!!lent Relations Bd., 336
U. S. 18, 26 (1949).
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continuous human relationship. The reader need not consider how far. or
into what channels, government should seek to shape its development. Government intervention at one point inevitably affects the whole course of
events. Where the Federal Government has enacted what was intended to be
a comprehensive program for dealing with such problems, it should be encourased to retain the responsibUity and the states should be excluded from
the entire area except where Congress has explicitly authorized them to intervene.
All that the author has been trying to do in this chapter thys far is to
show that the intent of Conaress cannot always be easlly perceived and that
even it it is seen it does not always mean as much as some judges try to make
it mean. However, there certainly 1. some evidence in the legislative his-

tory which shows what Congress intended to do in enacting the NLRA. Not all
cases have been decided. on the "bane or blessing" theory of Mr. Powell. For
example, the writer believes there is much evidence in the lel1slative history
of the act to show that Congress devoted a great amount of attention to the
question whether and to what extent Its legislation should supersede state law.
A suggestion was made during the course of debate in the House that the act
should contain a prOvision preserving the constitutionality of state laws in
the field of labor relations. But when Congressman Case of South Dakota.
replied "that to preserve ·State rights· in this field would nullify much of the
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Bill'\ 28 the suggestion was immediately abandoned and was never brought
to a vote.
This and other portions of the legislative history, which were mentione
in Chapter IV. the writer believes manifest at least some evidence of con-

gressional intent. Thus, there are some intentions of Congress clearly man'"
!fested as to what Congress expected the states to do in the field of labor relations, and there are others. as the statement ot Congressman C' se above.
which impel the courts to presume pre-emption where Congress is silent.
This does not mean that the Hbs.ne or blessing" theory of Mr. Powell is never
to be used. On

~~!e

',;oIltrary. there are many instances where the intent of

Congress is not clear and one will ha.ve to turn to see if the state regulation
I

I'

is good or evU. But
these are only in specific concrete cases.
.

As far as
.

the whole atmosphere of the NLR/; is concerned. the author believes that

there is evidence of congreSSional intent which outlaws the states f freedom
of action in the labor relations field. However, there are many judges who
disaaree with the author in their decisions, so now let us turn to the relevant
cases to ascertain their reasoning and critically review their assumptions.

28U• S. Congress. House, House Joint Resolution 3020, ConFessional
R.~cord, 80th Congress. 1st SeSSion, Wednesday, April 16$ 1947, Pt. In
(Washington 1947). P. 3559.

CHAPTER VI
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF RELEVANT CASES
We now come to the most important chapter of this thesis - the analysis
of pertinent court decisions dealing with our subject matter. Up to now the
author has attempted to give a foundation. partly theoretical, and partly factual, for a better understanding of the cases we shall now analyze.

In this

chapter the reader will see just how far a state may go in dealing with labor
relations. In other words, what limits are placed on state court jurisdiction
in the field of labor relations.

In analyzing these court decisions one shall

see two opposing views clash. On the one hand, the view of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter,29 which states that the states must be permitted to apply their
local policies in the absence of a clear manifestation of the intent of Congress to pre-empt the field, if the state law is not inconsistent; on the other
side, the view of Professor Archibald Cox of Harvard Law School, 30 which

29L • L . Joffe, "The Judicial Universe of Mr. Justice Frankfurter",
Harvard Law Review, LXn (Jan. 1949), 381.
See also Alyoma PllWood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin E.R. B. 336 U. S.
301 (1949).
30Archibald Cox, IIFederalism and Labor Relations ll , Harvard Law
Review, LXIV (Dec. 1950). 211.
- - - - - - - -"Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act",
Harvard Law Review, LXI (Nov. 1947). 1,
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upholds the argument that state reau1ation must be excluded in any field of
activity where Congress has shown its intention to regulate unless there is
an affirmative showing that the we:r was kept open tor state "p1atton. The
reader shall soon see that some judps follow their colleague. Justice Frankfurter. that others follow Mr. Cox, and that still others follow Mr. Thomas
Powell's IIbane or blessinl" theory. The latter choice does not always
stand alone but usually 1& the reason why a judge chooses one of the first
two alternatives. However, it is also possible that a judge wUlltmlt state
regulation merely because 1t is more of a "bane" than a IIblessmgll, regardless of hia feeling on the two opposq views of Justice Frankfurter and Professor Cox.
Before taking up the CaHS,the writer th1nk8 it wise to note a lew imPOI '"
tant points which make up the environment that surrounds these court decisions. To begin with it must be realized that this problem. which the author
wUl attempt to solve, is DOt a struggle between state and lederal lovernment
alone. It is true that the age-old problem of supremacy between the federal

government and. the state governments is very much a part 01 the problem.
But what 18 more important to the author's mind 1s the danger 01 industrial
instability which will arise if this problem is not met and solved. In other
words, the relationship between the lederal and state ,overrunents is not the
only thing at stake in this problem. but also the relationship between manage-
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ment and labor. It 1s only too clear that the industrial relations problem

a8

i1 stallds to4a)'is not a good one. Tbere is stUl much bitterness felt between
the parties. Therefore, the conflict

of

federal or state jurisdiction must be

cleared up soon or chaos will reault.. not ont)' within the aovernment but also·
between manacement and labor. In fact# it naturally follows that if there 1s
industrial instabUity. our capitalistic system is in danpr and. therefore,
our governm.ent of democracy.
It is in this llaht, the writer believes, that these cases should be read
with the avowed purpose of trying to achieve simplicity and certainty. Even

without actual contlict. UDcertainty as to which governmental " ..ney ... federal.
or atate .. was master would produce tndustr1al instabUlty. Therefore. the
writer th1nka that it is very important to have a definite and concrete rule
which works tolerably well in the majority of cases. rather than to have to w
on .bUtin, sands by deciding the rule on a cue to case basis. It is from this
point of view tnat the writer believes that the eases should be analyzed.

'For convenience. the writer shall discuss the.. cases in three parts those cases which came before the Garner case, the Garner case itself. and
thoM cktclsiou which came after the Garner case. The reaSQn for this 18
that the Qaraer ease is one of. the most important and tar .. reachinJ decisions
in the f18ld of labor relations handed down by the Supreme Court for many

years. In eliseu.sinl the problem in this way. the reader wUl see what the
law was up untll the time of that important decision aDd whether or not tbe
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Garner case is still the law today. The author will now review the leading
cases and see how the courts regard these powers granted to the National
Labor Relations Board. and whether such powers exclude the states from
acting. and if so, to what extent. keeping in mind all the time what has been
said in the previous chapters.
I BEFORE THE GARNER CASE

The first case which deals with our subject matter for all practical pur
poses. is the Allen-Bradley case. 31 This case shows clearly that the Supreme Court. in its attempt to adjust the boundary between federal and state
power to replate labor-manapment relations. was for a time of the opinion
that unless the state law directly conflicted with the federal law. state regu...
lation was not precluded. The facts of this case were as follows: The Wisconsin Board found that the union had engaged in mass picketing. threatening
employees. picketing their domiciles and obstructing factory entrances and
the free use of the streets; conduct which was an unfair labor practice under
the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act.

The Wisconsin Board ordered the

union to cease and desist from this conduct. although the activities of the em"
ployer undoubtedly affected interstate commerce. The question came before
the United States Supreme Court as to whether the enactment of the NLRA

S1Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Board, 315 U. S. 740 (1942).
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excluded regulation of such activity by the State of Wisconsin. The Supreme
Court said it was not necessary to treat the state act as a whole, but only
those provisions which authorize the State Board to enter such orders, since
there was a broad severabUity clause.
The Supreme Court heldI

In sum, we cannot say that the mere enactment of the
NLRA without more excluded state regulation of the type which
Wisconsin has exercised in this case. It has not been shown
that any employee was deprived of rights protected or granted
by the federal act or that the status of any of them under the
federal act was impaired. Indeed if the portions of the state
act here invoked are invalid because they conflict with the ted'"
eral act, then so long as the federal act 1s on the books it is
difficult to see how any state could under any circumstances
regulate pickeU ng or disorder growing out of labor disputes of
companies whose business atfects interstate commerce. 32
Thus, the

Allen"Bradl~y

case recognized the continuance of the tradi-

tiona! police powers of the states to prevent such union conduct as mass
picketing, threats or violence. 33

However, a state may not use the powers lett to its control to deprive
employees of the rights guaranteed them by the federal act. In other words,

32 Ibid. ~ 315 U. S. 748 (1942).

-

33MUk Wason Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies Inc., 312 U. s.
287 (1941): ThornhW v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940); Gibonel v. Em2ire

Storar: " Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490 (1949): Teamsters Union v. Honk~~ 339
U. S. 476 (1960); Bu1ldinl Service EmplOX!es International Union v. Qazzam,
339 U. S. 532 (1950); Hu&!!es v. Superior Cout:t, 339 U. S. 469 (1950).
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the state may not use ita traditional powers, if in so doing it obstructs full

effectuation of the federal policy. This was the general rule laid down in
Thomas v. Collins 34 and Hill v. Florida.3S In the latter case the United
States Supreme Court held invalid a Florida statute. where the state prescribed forfeiture of collective bargaining rights as the penalty for non-com..
pliance with the state requirements of having a union and Its agent procure a
sta.te license as a requirement or condition of bargaining for its members.
The Court reached the conclusion that the state statute conflicted wUh Section '1 of the NLRA because the Florida statute tlimpeded the tree exercise of
a federally established ript to collective bargaining.

/I

The Court maintained

that to uphold the sta.te statute would substitute the state of Florida's judg-

ment for the workers' judgment and would thus deprive them of their right,
protected by the lederal act, of freely choosing their bargaining represents."
Uvea. Again. in the Collins case, the United States Supreme Court declared
a Texas statute, requiring labor organizers to register with and procure an
organizer's card from a designated state official before soliciting member ..
ship in a labor union, invalid as being in cont11ct with federal jurisdiction and

"Thomas v. Collins. 323 U. S. 516 (1944).
35HUl v. Florida.. 325 U. S. 538 (1945).
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the NLRA which gives Congress the power to regulate labor unions in their
relation to the collective bargaining process.
The next ease involving the jurisdictional issue was the Bethlehem Steel

Co. case.

36

This case rejected the "concurrent" power

or Jurisdiction

theory37 of the Allen-Bradle;t case. In this case, foremen, em.ployees of
the Company" finding that the NLRA frustrated their desire for official cer-

Uiication as a barg;dning unit with the right to require the employer to bargain, filed a petition with the New York LRB, which proceeded to set up a
bargaining unit comprising the foremen. On appeal the New York Court of

Appeals upheld the state action and from there it was brought to the United
States Supreme Court which stated:
". • • However" the powers of the state may not so deal
with matters left to its control as to stand as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of CODaress.

lfJl the two boards attempt to exercise a concurrent jurisdiction to decide the appropriate unit of representation"
action by one necessarily denies the discretion of the other.
'The second to act either must follow the first, which would
make its action useless and vain, or depart from it, which
would produce a mischievous conflict. The State argues for

Ii

36Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York L.R~L 330 U. S. 767 (1947).
37 This famlliar rule is that where the actual incidence of federal regula
tioD depends upon action by an administrative a,ency and the agency has not
acted, the state may re,wate tbe same subject matter untU the federal agency
intervenes.
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rule that would enable it to act until the federal board has acted
in the same case. But we do not think that a case by case test
of federal supremacy is permissible here. The federal board
has jurisdiction of the industry in which these particular employees are engaNd and has asserted control of their labor relations
in general. "
Thus, this case stands for the principle that where the NLRB has asserted general jurisdiction over unions of foremen employed in industries
subject to the NLRA, but has refused to certify such unions as collective bargaining representatives on the ground that to do so at the time would obstruct
rather than further effectuation of the purpose of the Act, certification of
such unions by the New York State Labor Relations Board under a state Act
similar to the National A ct is invalid as in conflict with the NLRA and the
"Commerce Clause" of the Federal Constitution.
Although, on its face, the case seems to throw out the IIconcurrent" juris diction theory, a closer analysis of the decision might give us another conclusion. Even though the Bethlehem ruling made it clear that the states were
not always free to act until the NLRB assumed jurisdiction over the same
controversy, the opinion left the rationale of the decision uncertain.

The

failure of the NLRB to decide the question of representation involving Bethlehem foremen was clearly the result of a national policy opposed to the certification of bargaining representatives for supervisory employees. It could

S8 Ibid, S30 U. S. 773, 774 (1947).
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plausibly be contended, therefore. that the Bethlehem case held only that the
federal policy must control wherever there was direct conflict between the
policies of state and federal agencies having concurrent jurisdiction and that
except in cases of direct conflict (as there was in this case), the states could
continue to assert jurisdiction until the federal power is exercised or jurisdiction thereto is taken as to particular employees.

The writer believes

that this latter contention is the correct one to be applied to the Bethlehem
decision.
However. no matter what point of view one takes of the Bethlehem case,
the issue was decided in the LaCrosse case,39 which arose the following
year.

LaCrosse was a small telephone company which handled interstate

calls.

It had never been before the NLRB, but the NLRB had consistently

exercised jurisdiction over similar companies.

Prior to 1945, LaCrosse

voluntarily recognized the Interna.tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
as the collective bargaining representative of its plant and traffic depart-

ment employees.

Later, the Telephone Guild instituted a representation

proceeding before the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board seeking eertification as the representative of the same employees, plus the office employees.

After an election the Wisconsin Board determined that the plant

39LaCrosse Telephone Co. v. Wisconsin ERB, 336 U. S. 18 (1949),
336 U. S. 25 (1949).

I
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;'
I

and traffic
whose

~partment

repr~sentative

eJnp10yees constituted an appropriate bargaining unit

was the Telephone Guild.

The office employees were

I

placed in a sepa;rate unit but chose the same representative. The NLRB had
·i~

not u.ndertaken

~b

determine the appropriate bargaining unit.

There was no conflict between this state determination and any federal
rule. If the case had come before it. the NLRB. so tar as appears, would
have reached the same conclusion as the

Wi~consin

board. Yet the opportun-

I

ities for conflict and confusion were large. Representation cases turn primarUy on determinations of administrative policy concerning the time for
elections. the composition of the bargaining unit and the eligibility of voters •
..otuite apart from any collision between the formal orders of two boards, confUcts might arise in the administrative settlement of cases without a formal
ruling. The intervention of the state agency. even though it could be lormal1y reversed by a subsequent NLRB decision, might have the practical effect
of establishing a pattern of representation inconsistent with federal policy.
Even without conflict, as has been mentioned before. uncertainty as to which
board was master might produce industrial instability. For these reasons
the Supreme Court concluded that. - "the national Board had jurisdiction of
the industry in which those particular employees were engaged and had assened control of their labor relations in general . . • Since the employees in
question were subject to regulation by the National Board, we thought the sit-
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uation too fraught with potential conflict to permit the intrusion of the state
agency, even though the National Board had not acted in the particular cases
before us • • • • Those considerations control the present case. 1140 Thus
the "potential conflict 11 theory was established in the field of labor relations.
Therefore, what the Bethlehem case left unsolved. or at least ambiguou
the LaCrosse case solved and cleared up the ambiguity. For the Court decided in this case that whether the conflict be direct, indirect, or even if
there is no contlict at all. if the employer is subject to regulation by the
NLRB, the states will not be allowed to interfere for fear of "potential conflict." In other words, the LaCrosse decision holds that there does not have
to be a head-on collision between Federal and State directives, for there to
be an illegitimate intrusion into the jurisdiction of the national government.
The case further held that potential conflicts are enough to keep the states
out of the field labor relations.

Thus, the LaCrosse case makes it plain

that the states may not deal with questions of representation in industries
over which the NLRB customarily exercises jurisdiction. even though the
NLRB has not actually assumed jurisdiction in the specific case.
However, it was not lon, before the United States Supreme Court retreated from its position of "potential conflict" bars state action. For it

40336 U. S. 25 (1949).

.
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was only a rew months later that the Court decided the Briggs-Stratton

case~

Briggs-Stratton was engaged in the production of goods for interstate commerce. During contract negotiation. which became deadlocked. the union
called twenty-six unannounced meetings during working hours. all within a
space of four months.

These meetings during working hours naturally

caused work stoppages which interfered with production. No demands were
made on the company in connection with the stoppages.

The union's purpose

was to impose hardships on the company greater than the pressure of a
strlke.Brills .. Stratton appealed to the Wisconsin ERB which ordered the
union to cease and desist from the specific misconduct in which it had en,aged. On certiorari the Supreme Court held, five to four, that the prohibitions in Section 8(b) against certain kinds of strikes did not pre-empt the
field so as to prevent Wisconsin from dealing with the conduct of the union
even thou,h labor relations at the plant were subject in other respects to the
jurisdiction of the NLRB. The Court continued by saying:
"The substantial issue is whether Congress has protected
the union conduct which the state has forbidden, and hence the
state legislation must yield. . . Congress has not seen fit in
either (the NLRA or the LMRA) to declare either a general
policy or to state specific rules as to their effects on state
regulations over which the several states traditionally have
exercised control . . . . However. as to coercive tactics in

41 U. A. W. (A. F. of

L.l v.

Wisconsin ERB, 336 U. S. 245 (1949).

!
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labor controversies, we have said of the NLRA what is
equally true of the LMRA of 1947, that 'Congress designedly
left open an area for state control' and that 'the intention of
Congress to exclude the states from exercising their police
power must be clearly manifested. ,tl42
The Court next discussed the effect of the two labor acts. saying.
"While the Federal Board is empowered to forbid a
strike. when and because its purpose is one that the
Federal Act made Ulegal, it has been given no power to
forbid one because its method is illegal -- even if the illegality were to consist of actual or threatened violence to
persons or destruction of property. Policing of such conduct is left wholly to the states. In this case there was
also evidence of considerable injury to property and intimidation of other employees by threats and no one questions the states' power to poUee coercion by those methods. u43
The Court, through Mr. Justice Jackson. observed further,
tilt seems to us clear that this case falls within the rule
announced in Allen-Bradley that the state may police these
strike activities as it could police strike activities there,
because 'Congress has not made such employee or union
conduct as 1s involved in this case subject to regulation
by the Federal Board.' There is no existing or possible
conflict over overlapping between the authority of the
federal and state Boards.. because the federal Board has
not authority either to investigate. approve or forbid the
union conduct in question. This conduct is governable by
the state or it is entirely ungoverned. "44

42lbid. 336 U.

s.

252.

43Jbldr 336 U. S. 253.
44 lbid, 336 U. S. 253.
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rt'ben in summing up the Court eOllCluded.
"We find no basis for denying to Wisconsin the power.
in governing her internal affairs to regulate a cause of conduct neither made a right under federal law nor a violation
of it and which has the coercive effect obvious in this deviee. wiS
Although this case does show the retreat by the Supreme Court from ita
~cislon i.~ the

lin reacU.ng over

Bethlehem and LaCrosse cases, three points should be noted.
this decision,. unless we keep in mind what the Wisconsin

ERE was trying to do, the final remark of the court noted above may misead the reader. The employer who was being injured by the union's unan~ounced

~e ••

atopps.ge.. which took plnce without the employees leaving the prem-

rUed charges with the Wisconsin Board that the ullion was engaging in

unfair labor pracUces under the Wisconsin Act. The W1aeons1n Board pro ...
cessed these charges admtnistratively. and ordered the union to desist. This
~as

an adminiatrative process comparable to that with which the National

Board 1s charged. It was only the power to process the unfair labor practice
which was challenged here. and no other power or authority of the state. despite the broad language
~

ot the

dec1alon. Another important point to be noted

relation to this case is that, to the author's mind, the majority of the court

~as

not absolutely accurate. The writer believes that the Court's rationale
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is~

in

certa.L.~

}n!.3tances, vitiated by section 8{b)(1)(..':;',) of the Talt"Hartley

Act which was not menUoned by the Court. 46 This section clearly gives the
NLRB jurisdiction over at least some strike methods. It insures that certain strikes must be conducted peaceably by persuasIon and propaganda ana

not b;y physical force, or threats of torce. or of ec:ollOmic repriaal.. such as
physical intimidation at tellow employees
and similar or&anized coercion.

1»7 violent striking.. mus plcketinl

Thus" this section was clearly aimed at

q

the "means and not the " enda' , of a strike. 'Iherefore. when the court.
speakin, about the power of the Federal Board,. said: flit bas no power to

forbid ODe because its method 18 iUepl. but only to forbid if its enda is 11lepl'l .. was not abaolutely correct. A tAird point to be noted is that poten-

tialityof confUct exiats here. as weU as in the prohibited activity ease., a$

a reason tor deD1'inI state jurisdiction; the line dlv1dinc activities which are
protected by section ., from those which are unprotected is sufficiently abad-

owy to invite difference of opbUon. But no matter what one thinks of this

dec1a1oD" the Court by dietum swuDI the pendulum back to state control a.a
10111 •• the control was not in direct contlict with federal policy.

4G aec:tioll 8(b)(1)(A) prohibita cerlalo union tactics but is limited to such
tactics directed ",-,ainst employees and thus may not have been considered as
applicable to the tacta of the Bryp.. Stratton case.
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The resurrection of the "concurrent" theory of stnte regulation was extended even further by the ,~.lgoma case .. 47 which
This was the first unfair labor practice

ca~e

W$..!

decided

0

month later.

to :-aise the issue of supersed-

ure. In this ease the Wisconsin Employment Rehtlons

BOi~rd

had issued an

order requiring l\lgoma. Plywood & Veneer Co., an employer subject to the
NLRA, t,;; cease giving effect to a union security contract which had not been
,1pproved by two-thirds of the employees. a s required by state law. The
execution and application of the agreement were admittedly employer unfair
b.bor pr.lctices under the Wisconsin law .. but not under the

NLR}~.

The em-

ployer contended that the tederi?J statute dispu.ced the state legislation.

The

Court held.. however, that enforcement of the 'Visconsiu statute w&.s not precluded by the NLRA either In its oriainal form or as amended by the Taft ..
Hartley law. The rationale of the Court'. decision was that the states may

regulate the practices of employers which affect interstate commerce unless
the state reau1atlon is inconsistent with the federal law.

Part of the compnny's case was predicated upon Section 6(3) of the original Wagner Act, which was still in force when the events in question took
place although not at the time of the Supreme Court decision. Section 8(3)
prohibited discrimination against employees because ot their union mer.o.ber-

47 !~lioma Ply!ood &. Veneer Co,. v. Wisconsin ERB, 336 U. S. 301 (1949).
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ship or their failure to belong to a union, but a proviso declared that "nothing
in this Act, or in any other statute of the United States ll should prohibit dis-

charges pursuant to a union security contract with a union representtng a
majority of the employees in the bar,ain1ng unit. 48 The opinlon of the Court
did not expressly consider whether Conaresa pre"empted the field of discriminatory discharges aUecting interstate commerce by the enactment of
this legisb.tion. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who delivered the op1niou. appears
to have assumed tha.t tbe power of wtacoDSin to "plate such labor practices
turned exclusively upon the question whether the state regulation was consistent with national policy or curtailed the exercise of a federal ri.bt to enter
into union security agreements. From a review of the legislative history be
concluded that the proviso merely disclaimed any national policy hostile to
union ap-eements. leaving their status to be determined by the states. The
same assumption appears in the Justice's diacus$lon of the Taft-Hartley

amendme nts, for he pitched this brancb of the ease upon an inquiry into
whether the amended Act expressed a policy inconsistent with the Wisconsin
la.w.

49

Again, in answering the company's argument that a.n earlier NLR8

certification of the union as the representative of its employees ousted the

4849 ~ 452 (1935), 290 U. s. C. 1158(3) (1946).

49Jbldl 336 U. S. 313.
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state of jurisdiction over its labor relations, the Justice declared:
ItSlnce the enumeration by the Waper Act of unfair labor
practices over which the National Board baa exclualve jUl"iSdictioa doea not prevent the States from enforciDl their
own policies in matters not aoverned by the federal law. such
freedom ot action by a state cannot be lost because the National
Board bas once held an election under the Wagner Act. The
character of activities lett to State regulation 1s not chaIlled
by the fact ot certification. Certification. it is true. make.
clear that the employer and the union are subject to federal
law. but that is not disputed. So far as the relationship of
State and national power 1s concerned. certUleation amounts
to no more than an assertion that as to th1a emplo;yer the
State shall not impose a polley 1nconslatent with national
pollcy_ •• $ the National Board~s interpretation of tb.at
policy•••

n

.c\nd he cla.ssified both the Eethlehem
, and LaCrosse cases as instances of in-

consistency.
However. it was not long before the pendulum swung the other way, and
the court reasserted its rejection of concurrent jurlsdietion by the states, aad

resurrected federal supremacy over the field of labor relations. A year had
not elapsed when the Plankinton case 61 came before the United states Bu-

pz..me Court.
On February 20~ 1945. the National War Labor Board had issued a dirac:

live requirilll Plankinton and the representative of its employees to enter in-

50lbld, 336 U. S. 314.

fHplankintol} Pack!!!& Co. v. Wisconsin ,EBB, 838 U. S. 853 (1950).

59
to

8.

contract containing a maintenance of membership clause applicable to

employees who were union members on March 9. 1945. On February 20,

Stokes was a member of the union, but he reai,ned during the escape period.
Nevertheless. the employer discharged Stokes upon the union's demand.
The Wisconsin Board concluded that both the employer and the union were

guilty of unfair labor practice. under the WiacomsiD Employment Peace Act,

Both respondents challenged the jurisdiction of the state board on the ,round
that the company was engapd in interstate commerce within the NLRA. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the state board had jurisdiction, "liter
argument on the merits, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed
~ cur~"

without opinion.. the decislon of the Wisconsin Supreme Court,

ciUng the Bethlehf;!m and LaCrosse cases.
In the absence of an opinion, one hesitates to draw firm inferences from

the Plankinton decision.

It would seem to represent a sharp departure from

tbeA1soma assumption that the states may regulate the practices of employE:8S

which affect interstate commerce unless the state regulation is inconsis-

tent with the federal law. There was no appreciable danler of conflict in the
Plankinton case. Theoretically, the NLRB mi.ht have made different findin,s of fact than the Wisconsin Board and. therefore. mi&ht have reached a
different conclusion. The risk of tlpotenUal conflict", however, is so famU-

60
iar an aspect of our legal system and 15 also a matter of such small moment
that the mHn, can hardly be explained on that ground. Conceivably, there
might be minor discrepancies between tbe two boards in fashioning a remedy

once the unfair labor practice was proved. Reinstatement with back pay,
however. is the normal remedy in most jurisdictions. Posaible variations
in rulln, upon alleged grounds for denyin, reinstatement or In computing
back pay a.re trivial matters. Nor would it impose serious hardship upon
the persons subject to regulation to require them to deal with two sets of
officials. The true explanation of the Plankinton decision appears to be that
the Court was now willing to

,0

one step further than the tlpotential conflict l'

theory of the LaCrosse decision, and was prepared to appl,. in the labor fleld
the long line of precedents holding that when the tederal power to regulate

interstate commerce has been exerted, state laws have no application. They
can.."1ot be applied !fin coincidence with. as complementary to or as in opposi"

tion to, federal enactments which disclose the intention of Congress to enter
c. field of regulation that is within its jurisdiction. 1152

However. even if the plankinton decision cannot be said to have beld to

such a strong conclusion, the O'Brien case,53 decided in the same year,

52Mlssouri-Pacitic R. R. v. Porter 273 U. S. 346 (1927).
53lnternational Union U. A. W. (C. I. 0.1 v. O'Brien 339 U. S. 454 (1950).
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certainly took a step in this direction.. A Michigan strike control law re"
quired employees desiring to strike to file certain notices with the State
Board of Mediation and lurther provided that no strike should be authorized
unless a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit voted in favor ot
such aciion. 54 The United Automobile Workers struck against Chrysler Cor
porntion without complying with the statute. To enjoin a possIble prosecu'"
tion, tJj\W brought a bill for an injunction. The Supreme Court of Michigan
held that the sto.tute was valid and a.pplicable to the union even though Chrysler employees were covered by the NLRA. On appeal. the Supreme Court of
the United States reversed the judgment. holding that the Michigan statute

could not constitutionally be applied under these circumstances to employees
whose activities affected interstate commerce.
The opinion

ot the Court, which was delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Vin-

son. draws upon two lines of analysis. First, the state law attempted to lim
it a federal right. since in the original NLRA tfCongress safeguarded the ex..

erciee by employees of 'concerted activities· and expressly recognized the

54Michisan Compo Laws 1423. 1 (1948). The difference between the
federal and state laws was the following: (1) different ea.-lad for the livinS
of notice; e. g. state'" 20 days; federal - 60 days; (2) no majority vote for
strikes in the federal law; (3) unit to be voted on would be conf1ned within
the state; (no comparable J):rovislon in the tederallaw).
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right to strike. u55 Second, Coaar.as itself had qua11t1ed and regulated that
right in the 1947 Act. Thus. Congress ltoccup1ed this field and closed it to
state regulation. u58 The same or parallel reasoning is applicable to any
peaeeful strike arising out of grievances or eontract negotiations.

With

small mod1t1cations it could be invoked in the case of strikes for "tOOl" objectivea. The conclusion to which the decision points - that the Court is

about to bold that the Federal Government has excluded the states from regulating strike., pieketing and other "concerted activities" in industries atlecting commerce - is also supported by the clOSing pars.graph in the opinIon in which Mr. Chief Justice Vinson tmswered the contention of the state

authorities that their action was sustained by the Briggs-Stratton case.
"Clearly, we reaffirmed the principle that it 'Congress has protected the

union cOl'lduet wbich the state bas forbidden the state legislation must yield.
That principle Is controlling here. HIT

_

f

_-

Nevertheles., there are other passages 1n the O'Brien
opinion making
..
the deciSion susceptible

ot a narrower interpretation. The Chief Justice was

--- ._._-----""..........-

S6 Ibid, 839 U. S. 457.

56Dl~d~

57~~. 339 U. S. 459.
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eareful to state that "even if some state regulation in this area could be sustained, the particular statute before us could not stand. 1158 The Michigan
statute prescribed different periods for the giving of notices than the federal

law. Congress had considered proposals to take a vote before permitting a
strike and rejected them on their m.erits.

The unit in which the state vote

was to be taken would have to be confined within the borders of Michigan

whereas the NLRB had certified UAW for a unit of Chrysler employees emplayed in plants in California and Indiana as well

f?S

MiChigan.

The Chief

Justice continued by sayin... "A sta.te statute so at war with the !ederallaw
cannot survive. ,,:;9 If

til

majority of the Court should subsequently abandon

the bdic philosophy underlying other parts of the opinion, these factors

would faeUltate distinguishing the O'Brien ease.
However.. in the lipt of the present authorities, two conclusions seem
warranted. First. the right to eng.ap in "concerted a.ctivities" 15 a federal

rilht whieb the states may not abridge. Second. NLRA Section 8(b) also

im-

poses restraints upon state regulation by pre .. empting part, but not all of the
field of employee activities. On prilleiple, the states would seem to be as

58;'!bi~!. SS9 U. S. 458.
59 lb~. 339 U. S.
. 458-9.

6"
powerless to restrict the federal right or regulate conduct in the pre-empted
area by the familiar labor injunction as they are by statute or administrative
order. The re lore. the conclusion that we should draw from the

O'~r!e.t.!

case, and stUI be on safe ground is that where a. strike or any "concerted
activity 11 is peaceful and lawful!t is within the federal jurisdiction. It Is
or..ly when it becomes unlawful and endangers the general welf"re that a state
may step in with ita police power, the latter falling outside the protection of
the federd .Act.
The swing of the pendulum was kept moving by the Bus

case, 60 which was decided the following year.
similar to the

O'B~!!!! Crt$e.

Empl~..!.

The facts of this case were

The union and employees in the former case,

however" were in the public utility industry and were ostensibly covered by
a state anti-strike compulsory arbitration statute. In other words, the state
act required th..:'lt collective barga.in1n, continue until an II impasse II was
rea.ched and then made provision for compulsory arbitration, whereas the
tederal~,ct

required both employer and the union to continue to bargain c01-

lectively even though a strike may actuallY be in progress. The Court found
invalid the Public Utility l\nti-strike Aet as applied to a local transit eom6

60\ma1samated Stre~t Railway EmplOj"!es v. Wisconsin ~!l!!. 340 U. S.
383 (1951).
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pany and a local gas company, whose activities affect interstate commerce.
The Court said,

>tIt 1s true that this is a local pubUc utUit7 and not a
national manufacturin, organization but CODlJ"ea. has made
no d1stiDction but repla•• labor relations to the full extent. Federal labor legislation. eneompa.s1n, as it does
al11nduatr1es 'affecting commerce·, applies to a privately
owned public utility whose business and activities are carried on wboll)' within a stna1e state. uS1
The Court then concluded that,

HIt would be sufficient to atate that the Wisconsin Aet.
in forbldd1n& peaceful strike. for hiJb,er wa,.s 1n industries covered by tbe Federal Act baa forbJ.ckten the exercise of rights protected by Seetion '7 of the Federal Act. fl62
The O'Brien and Bu. Empl9l!!s ca... relate to wbat the Court telt were

unmistakable overlapping_ of the state lawa with the federal Act, and hence
concluded that the state law8 mu.t J1eld. The.e two cases. aloD, with the

Planldnton ca88, stand for the propoSition that where there is a federally
proteeted ript. a atate may not act in any way to destroy or detract trom
th1a federally protected rlaht.

And U the state does aet, its action will be

held null and void.

Theretore. tile Planldnto!l.t O'Brien and Bus Empl0:t!•• decisions are ex"

611bid, 340 U. S. 385.
62lbld, 340 U. S. 398"
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tensions of the npotentlal conflict It rule of the LaCrosse ease. And in the
U,bt of the O'Brien and B;ua Emplol!!a easea, we need no "potential eODflict.
It

tt

The tact tbat Congress has seen tit to "protectlt certain rights and

prob1bltl! othera is enough on Ita faee to do away with state jurisdiction.

Thus, the age-old "pre-emption doctrine'" whleb we discussed in one of the

earlier chapters eomes to the fore - supersedure of atate l.plaU". power
in a reaulated field Is necessary to preserve the inteF'lv of eonaress·

judcment that the rights and remedies which it provtdes are sufficient. The
cas•• stand for the general principle that the desirabUtt,. of having a single

arbiter of labor disputes outwelp.s the advantap of the speedier settlement
of disputes ottered by state boarcls.
Th1s waa the atmosphere settl81 before the Garner caM_

Althou,h

there were st111 maDY dubious are.. in the flald of labor relations concern...

in,

the jurisdictionallsaue, and the osematin, 01 the Supreme Court was

not an uncommon occurrence, the pendulum bad definitely a..uD, to the aide
of federal supremaey'.

n

THE GARNER CASE 83

In this cas. the law as to just what jurisdiction the states '11111 be allowed

83Qa~D8r v. I. B: of T _Local Union No. 778, 346 U. s. 485 (1953)

67

in cases involving labor relations which affect interstate commerce was deelared. This case dealt directly with the issue of state versus lederal juris diction In labor disputes.

1'he facts of this case are relatively simple. The company was an interstate carrier which eUlployed twenty-four men, four of whom were members of Teamsters Local No. 776. The company had no objection to the
rest becoming members. No controversy, strike or labor dispute was in
progress.

The defendant union peacefully picketed in order to gain union

membership for the non"members. The company sought an injunction
against tb1a picketing by the defendant union in the state court, for the reas ..
on that the picketilla reduced their business as much aa ninety-five per cent.
The lower court granted the restraining order.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. the restraining order
was dissolved, the court stating. ''In our opinion such provisions for a com..
prehensive remedy precluded any state action by way of a different or additional remed7 tor the correction of the identical grievance. 1164 The court, at '

course, was referring to remedies provided by the National Labor Relations
Act. as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. 65

64!!!msters Local No.

11!. v.

Joseph Ga~1 373 Pa. 19 (1953).

6549 ~ 449 (1935), as amended 290 U. S. C. 1151 (1946).

-------------------------.l'iII,
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The purpose of the picketing was thought to be to coerce the employtn-•
through a reduction of his profits by picketin.& to in turn coerce his employ·
ees into joining the defendant union. This Is an unfair labor practice under
the federall~ct. which prOvides:

"It shall be an unfa.ir labor practice tor an employer • • •
(3) by discrimination in re,ard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. n6G
f ..n1 such conduct amounting to an

untau' labor practice is within the jurisdie...

tion of the Labor Board. 67
On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, the Pennsylvania
high court was sustained. It was po1nted out by the Court that this was not a

case of injurious conduct which the Board was without express power to prevent, and which, if it could not be prevented by the state, could not be prevented at all. Similarly. this was not, as the Court pOinted out, a case of
Hmass piekeUn&, threatenina of employees, obstructina streets and highways.

or plcketil1i homes. We have held that the state stUl may exercise its histor1e powers over such traditionally local matters as public salety and order and

6661 ~ 140 (1981); 29 U. S. C. 1158 (1946).

67Ibid. §160(j)
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the use 01 streets and highways. 1168
The Garner case involved. a type ot conduct which was definitely within
the jurisdiction of the Board. and tbere were no extenuating circumstances

which would remove it from such jurisdiction.
Since the Board has the power and authority to take in hand such a. controvers)", the issue beca.me whetht-r the State. through its courts, could
judge the same controversy and extend its own form of relief.
The main holdlng of the case 1s as follows:
Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule
of law to be enforced by IlD7 tribunal competent to apply
law aenerally to the parties.. It went on to confide prim.ary
interpretation and application of its rules to a specifie and
speeia11y constituted tribunal and prescribed a particular
procedure tor 1nvestilaUo~ c:omplatnt a.nd notice, and
hearing and decision, including jUdicia 1 relief pending a
tinal administrative order. Conaress evidently c0ll81dered
that centralized administration of specially destined procedures was neee.sar,. to obtain uniform application ot its
substantive rules and to avoid dlverdt1es and confilcts
Uk.!y to result from a variety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies. A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures are quite as apt to produce
incompatible or eonflietin, adjudications as are c:W'ferent rules
of substantive law. The same reasonin, which prohibits
federal courts trom intervening in such eases. except by way
of review or on application of the federal Board, precludes
state courts from dOing so. And the reasons for excludin.
state administrative bodies tl"om assumil1l control of mattera
expressly placed wi thin the competence of the federal Board

88.t..llen-Bradlez Local v. Wisconsin Board, 315 U. S. 740 (1942).

70
also excludes state courts from like action. 69
The Court implied further in its decision that if Congress prohibits certain
things in a category, then the rest of those things are to be left free and not
to be interfered with.

For the court stated. "The NLRA only prohibits some

picketing. Now. for a state to impinge on the area of labor combat designed
to be free is quite

CIS

much an obstruction of federal policy as if the state

were to declare picketing free for purposes or by methods which the federal
Act prohibits. ,,70 Thus. the doctrine of "pre-emption" comes to the fore
once again.

Therefcre. it is not the possibility of conflict which distrubs

this court. but the fact that once Congress has protected certain rights and

set up remedies in order that these rights might be so protected, no other
agency in our jucU.ci.al system should be allowed to set up either new or dilferent remedies, nor similar remedies. III other words" what the Court 1s
aaying in ita decision is that if ConlNs. provides that the punishment for
violating an Act of Conareas shall be a certain fine. and if a state lelisature
then provides tor

aD

additional

nne or imprisonment for the same violation,

the state law. to be sure, would not prevent the tederal law from beinl carried into execution but surely the wUl of Co• •a. ia, nevertheless. thwarted

69Garner v. 1. B.

ot T. Local Union No. 776. 34. U. S. 490.

70,D,1d, 348 U. S. 491
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and opposed. This is particularly true in the field of labor rehltions, where
the choice of remedy and forum has been no less a burning legislative issue
than the choice of a substantive rule, and where the ultimate pattern of the
federal legislation refiects the best compromise obtainable by opposing forces. Thus. Congress' decision as to what the rights of the parties should be
left no room for the survival of causes of action, either private or public.
based on state law. Consequently. under

pre~emption

standards, the pro-

priety of state court relief does not turn on whether the claim is predicated
upon state law or upon the national act.

The test, rather, 1s whether the

transaction involved is in the "field" covered by the national act. If

50,

the

rights to which it gives rise flow exclusively from the federal law; substantive rights as well as remedies flowing from state authority a re superseded.
The remainder of the case was devoted to overruling the a!"gument that
the Board remedy was public. while the state court remedy was private.

~nd

that thus the two were not mutually exclusive remedies. Tbe Court cast this
argument aside by denying a distinction between public and private rights
under the NLRA.
ally is exerted

The Court merely said, "When federal power constitution-

tor the protection of public or private interests. or

both~

it

becomes the supreme law of the land and cannot be curtailed, circumvented
or extended by a state procedure merely because it will apply some doctrine

I

72

.

of private right." 71 Then as U to completely ignore the argument, the Court
mentioned that this is arguing beside the point since lithe conflict lies in
remedies t not rights.
And the Court concluded that since the petitioner could have presented
h1s

grievance to the Nationru Labor Relations Board, and did not. his ,riev-

anee was held not to be subject to litigation in the state courts.
The

Gar~r

ca.se seems to lay down the law concerning federal and state

jurisdiction in the field of industrial relations affecting interstate commerce

By virtue of the "Supremacy Clause" in the Constitution. any state law which
either duplicates. complements or supplements Congressional regulation
must fall. 1\1so when Congress establishes rights. the states will not be allowed to detract or destroy such federally Hprotected" rights, nor wUl the
state be allowed to permit actions which Congress has seen fit to ilproh1hittl.
Therefore, the state will not be allowed to cause an undue risk of interferen
with basic federal policies

co~erninl1ndustrla1

relations. On the other

hand, since the national /\ct pre-ampts only the field of labor relations law
and policy, the states are not precluded from applying to unions, employees

or employers the same general legal and policy standards which are appllcable to citizens generally.

Violence by unions or employees. and unlawful

seisure 01 property, for example, are not placed beyond the power of the

71lbid. 346 U. S. 493.
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states to control merely because they occur in a labor relations context.
However. it must be understood, that it easy evasion of the Conaresslonal
pre-emption pulicy is to be avoided, state regulation, as b.u been mantia_d
above, wb1¢h, in fact, duplicates or complements the protecUon accorded
by the federal .A.ct to the rights which 1t I\larantees cannot be permitted to

stand,
be.

DO

matter how differently conceived or oriented the state polley may

And, of course. U application of

an)'

state law or poUcy involves

£01'-

feilure of riFts guaranteed by the Dational Act. or obstructs effectuation of
the national polley, the state law cannot be given effect.

Thus, the
-

Ga.rne~

decision was hailed as the great emancipating decision

emancipating labor Wliona from having to try their cases in state courts

where there was all t.oo often little sympathy shown for the union cause. Or,
at least. sympathy for the way in wblch the labor cause was manifested.
ill Ali'TER THE GAMER CASE
'l'he first pertinent cue subsequent to the .Q~ case was

Bulldl~g

Trades CouncU v. Kinard Construction Co. 12 In this case the Supreme
•

t

court at the United States reversed a judgment by the ."labama Supreme

72BuildinS Trades Coancil v. Kinard Construction 90., 846 U. S. 933
(1954).

74

Court which granted injunctive relief against picketing which was an unfair
labor practice under the National Labor Relations Act and which affected

commerce. This was done on the basis of the holding in the Garner case.
It was also held that it was unnecessary to decide whether or not the state

court would. have jurisdiction to poant relief in such ca..e it the National
Labor Relations Board should decline to exercise its jurisdiction. since
there was no clear showing that application for relief had been made or that
it would have been tutUe to make such application to the NLRB.

This latter issue has never been decided by the United States Supreme
Court. As a result all we have to rely on 1s conjecture. From

Ii

reading of

the past cases the npotential conflict II usument.. to be !!lure,. would be ad-

vanced to bar state jurisdiction. for the NL8B. having discovered that the
field of labor regulation is not one to which mathematical formulae can be
applied successfully.. has departed from its jurisdictional standard when to
do 80 would better effectuate the poliey of the ,1\:ct. Thus, IIpotential conflict" becomes a reality. But Congress has plainly shown an intent tbat certain activities should be regulated, and if the states do not step in when the

NL,H.B refuses to do

50.

they will not be regulated at all, and a Iino-man'a-

land'; comes into being in the field of interstate labor relations. This issue.
to be sure. is a dilemma which should be cleared up by the Supreme Court
as soon as possible.

75
The next ca.. to come to the Supreme Court was the C!pita1 Service

cue 73. which involved a eompleteq new issue.

The issue of this ca•• was

the toUowina: "In view of the tact that exclusive jurildietion over the Gubject
matter was vested in the National Labor Relations Board could the Federal
District Court. on application 01 the Board, enjoin peUtioners from enlore-

1nI an 1njunct~on already obtained from the State Court. 1174
In the state court. Capital Service had obtained a reatraininl order re-

straJ.1lJDi the defendant union from peacefully picketing, purs1.1ant to a. labor
dispute between the parties. An unfair labor practice char,. had been tUed

status quo pending the outcome of the complaint.
The Board had then ,one into federal court seek.tna to restrain Capital
Service from enforcing therestra1n1nc Qrder obtaiDed by Capital Service til

the state court.

The Federal Cireuit Court of Appeals had stated. "The boycott of the
product of Service'. bakers to restrain their opposition to and to compel

their wuonization 18 prohibited by Section 8(b)(1) of the Taft"Sartley Act.
We th1nk ConIN•• has pre-empted this function to the National Labor Bela-

73f.a.e!tal Berrie. Ine. v. NLR~4 347 U. S. 501 (1954).

74Jb~f 347 U. S. 502.

76
tions Board and that the state court 1. without jurisdiction to issue such an

injunction. 1175
The Supreme Court of the United States granted cert10rar1 in this case

and held: " ••• Where Congres., ACtin, within its constitutional authority,
has vested a federal agency with exclusive jurisdiction over a subject matter
and the intrusion of a state would result in confli.ct of functions, the federal

court may enjoin the state proceedinlin order to preserve the federal
right .. 1176

'l"'he Court concluded that If if the .tate court decree were to stand. the

Federal District Court would be llmited in the action it might take* to exer'"

cise its juriacUction freely aDd fully It must first remove the state decree.
When ltdid so.it acted 'where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction. ,111'1
Thus by the

~p1tal ~rvice

and fUnard cases. the principle of the

.Q.:!-

.!!!: case was extended and fortified. Also a signifieant point 1s that the Alabama Supreme Court. which in tile past has always upheld state jurisdiction
in labor relations and baa turned down the "potential conflicf' theorYI decid-

75~LR' v. Ca.p!ta1 Service" 104 F. ad 848" 850 (9th Cir. 1953).

77Jbid. 347
-

76lbid. 347 U. S. 503.
U. S. 505.
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ed in fr'f~ Ledbetter case, '78 that the atate eourt was without jurisdiction to
enjoin pieketina which amounted to unfair labor practices under the federal
Act.

When a labor dispute affeots interstate commerce, the Act vests ex'"

elusive jur!sd1cUon to regulate auch disputes in the federal Board, held the
Court. 79 Thus. it would seem that the law as laid down by the GarnE!£ ca.e

was well founded and c10ae17 adhered to. However_ the .supreme Court of
the United states still had to deal w1th the Laburnum ease80• wbleh took

.

away some of the "steamtt from the Gamel" decision •
t~ccording

to the Laburaum dec1aion, the NLRA a. amended baa not
.,.

r

given the NLRB exclusive juriadictiOD over the subject matter 01 a c:ommon-

law tort aetlon tor damage. so .. to preclude an appropriate state court
from hearin, and determining Its Issues where such conduct cowstitutes an
unfair labor practice under the Act.

The Court

po~;.lted

out tbat

78Montgomerl DuUdin, and Construction Traders <;:ouncU v. Ledbetter
Erection Co., a Ala. 1" (ltI4).
'liThe SUpreme Court of the Ua1te4 State. refused to handle the case on
the ground that it would not judge on a temporary injunction since it is not tiDal and therefore dlam1ased the writ of certiorari wbich 1t had granted.
SOUnited Conatruction Worker. v. Laburnum Const. CO!]?, 347 U.S.G56
(1954).

"I",

'1

!tIn the G~.rner ca..e. Congress had provided a federal
adminJ.atrative remed.y. supplemented by Judicial procedure
for Us enforcement, with which the state injunctive procedure confUcted. Here eonar.s. has neither provided nor
suggested any substitute for the traditional state court procedure for collecting damages for injuries caused bY' tortiOus
conduct. For Uli to cut ott the injured respondent from his
right of recovery wW deprive him of his property withQut
recourse or compensation. 1181

Then the Court gave the rationale for its deci.sion:
111'0 the extent that Congress prescribed preventive procedure against uufaa labor practice., confl1cting state procedure to the same end. is excluded.. To the extent. however.
that Congress has not pN8CI"ibed proced.ure tor dealing with
the consequences of torUous conduct cl.re ..~dy committed,
there is no around for concludint that exist1ng criminal pen"
alties or liabtliUes for tortious conduct have been elixninated. HS

The Court also pointed out that.. liThe LMRA sets up no ,eneral co
satory proceciure except in such minor supplementary ways as the reinsta. e-

ment of wrongfully dlscharled employees with back-pay. 1183
The Court the ~l concluded by &&)'1nl:

lfThe Act did DOt expressly relieve labor organizations
from l1ab1litT for unlawful conduct. If a state is denied jurisdiction. it wID mean that where the federul preventive administrative procedures are impotent or inadequate. the
offenders. by coercion of the type found here. may destroy
property without Uab1l1ty for the damage done. If petitioners

81 lbidt 347 U. S. 657.

82 Ib14, 347 U. S. 658.
83ll?1d, 347 U. S. 659.

I

'i
'I
I

,1::11
"I

'19

were unorganized private per.ons, conducting themselves
as petitioners did here. Virginia would have had jurisdiction. The fact that the petitioners are labor orlaJ1izaUons.
with no contractual relationship with the respondent. or its
emplo,..e.. Rrov1des no reasonable baais for a different
conclusion. 1184
There was a. strong dissent by Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice

Black in this ease, which stated:
"The federal act was designed to decide labor-management controversies; to brina them to a peaceful, orderly
settlement. If the parties not only have the remedy Congress
provided but the right to sue for damages as well, the controversy is not settled by what the federal agency does. It
dralS on and on in the courts, keeping old wounds open and
robbin, the administrative remedy of the healing effects it
was intended to atve. A union does not have a choice of
remedies but may only iutitute proceedings before the
NLRB. Therefore, since the union cannot sue the employer
tor tortious conduct, the employer should not be able to sue
the union. :f85
The dissent

argues~ in

'I
i

the author l • opinion, beside the point and is

faulty in its cone!u.1on. The fact remains that Congress d1d not prescribe a
procedure for tortious conduct and therefore some remedy must be liven.
The conclusion is taulty for to say that a union'. tortious conduct is the same
as an employer's 1s ludicrous. It 1a true that the employer may commit a
tort alainst a union but the chances of this happenine 1s very

841bide 34'1 tJ. S. 661.
85lbid, 347 U. S. 663.

r$mote~

whereas

I.

80

a union commits torts against employer, e. g.
quite frequently.

l~lso.

#

destruction of propert)',

altbouJh a union may not be able to sue an employer,

an individual of that union may. and as the writer sees it this is the ol1ly wa)'
that a.n employer can commit a tort. In other warda .. if there is a tortious
actiOll

by an employer, it will be apinst the individuals of a union, and not

the union as an enUt)'_ Thus it would seem that the dissent is a little "off..

baaet! in its argument, whUe the majority holdinl.sems more logical and
fair.

'II

Therefore, it would seem that the sweepin, language of the qar~r CaM,llr
!!II

which seemed to leave l1tUe, if 1Ul1, jur1.sdiction to the states touching a ,
labor matter subject to NLRS replation, 1. not
lanlWlle ind1catea.

50

encompassing as its

When construed 111 the light of the Laburnum decision.

it becomes clear that the classification is one of remedies rather than of

rights. It now seems that the Board has exclusive jurisdiction only when thel!1I'!
NLBB as amended provides a remedy for conduct condemned by it, with
which any state action would conflict. According to the

Labu~num

case, it

the sta.te courts otter a remedy wh1eh wUl not conflict with present or future
action by the NLRB and which is not avai1~ble under
jurisdiction to award it.

lUBO the

t.ht! act 86.

they have

states have jurisdiction because as the

court pointed out there wu no conflict between state and federal law because
'I'

86~se words are very important in that they show that the 1'potential

L-c_o~nn~lc~t~~~o~r~y~ls~mn~~thr~o~w~n~ou~t~.

'I"

__________________________________~II
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the cranting of damages by litate courts was consistent with LMRA because

damage remedy 18 distinguishable in kind from the federal injunction remedy.
The principle of the Garner case and the Hpre-emption" doctrine was

further fortified and extended by the Anheuser-Busch Inc. case. 87 Anbeuser-

Busch was engaged in the interatate manulacture and sale of beer. There
was a dispute between the machinists and the carpenters over the work to be
performed for the company. The machinists' union picketed the company's

brewe..,. as part of an attempt to pt inCluded in their coUective ba.rgaininl
asreement with the company a clause providing that the eompall7 would not
let contracts for new construction to a.n.y independent contractor who did not
employ members of the machinists' UD10n to take care of the moving. ereet...
ing and lruIJtalling machinery.
The bargaining agreement provided that the machinists' union should do

all such work pertormed within the employer's plant. What, in ettect. was
desired by the machinists was to ge' work for the1r union which had customarily been done by the Millwrights union.

Be<:ause of the protests of the M1llwriahts UnIon, the employer struck
the advanta.geous clause from the contra.ct.

'l"ben the

m~lC:hinlstsl

on strike and picketed the employer's place of business.

87Webe,r v •.Anheuser-Busch ,nc •• 348 U. S. 468 (1955)

union went

'j

83

A state may not e.njoln under ita own labor atatute
conduct wMdt has been made an "unfair labor practice!!
under the federal atatuie.
H

"When thtl If LaB held that QOnduct of the urd.oD cU.d DOt
eouUtute an. unfair labor practice under the LMRA.
allepcl bY' tbeemplo".,. to have been violated. but 10 the
emplO)'er' a complaint fUed in tbe atate court for injuDCtlve
reUGf. the emplo,er broatle..d ita alle,aUou to incl.
viola.t1on of other Mottola of the Act. the state court d1fi
not hav. juri8dicUon to eDjoin the UDiou' conduct tor violation of hch se<=tiona. aince the Board had the power in
the first instance. to determiDe whether the untOld· coaduct
consUtuted an Wlfalr labor practice uDder those Mctlon••
nWben the movinl party 1t..11 aU• • • unfair labor
pra.c:ticea. wlMJn the fa.. 1'fit1lUWUY.bl1 'brlul the co~s1
within the .ections problbtUD, the.. practice., and when
tbe Cl01UNCt,if BOt prob1bitM b7 the lederal Act. m&7 be
reasonably deemed to come within the proteetlon afforded by
that i\crt. the state covt muat dedJ.rle juriad1ction ill cleferenee

w the tribunal wh.i.ch Coqre•• ha4 selected for detetmiDinl
such 18a\\8$ in tbe first iDatanc.e. 1188
'l'hU5, It would

_In

that the Supreme Court of t.be United &tatea is w11'"

Un. to a4lcept the GarDet' ea.. a. the law of the land" with C8rtaiA except10u

such ali a. atate
(I:~burJlUl'!-

1.

jur1sdieUon to grant dam.P.ps for Common Law Torts.

cas.) It would aeem from the

Garne~

and .A!!J!~r-Bu!c~ CaMS

that the sup.relnacy of the Nl..ftB is upheld and that the pendulum haa

a.Wl,

completely OY$r to the aide of fede:r:ial control. However.. the Ricbman

BrotheH case haa caused the pendulum to oscUlate once again.

'-

In the lUc!unan Brother. cue 8S tbe A. C. W.; aD unincorporated associ-

.......-----..........,;--...........

atiOft of e10tado, workera, peaeefW1r picketed a number of Rlchm.ao Brothers
retail st...., presumabl, to compel ita factorT empl0J"8 to jolrl their union
Richman Brothers is eDgaptlln the manufacture aDd sal. of ments clothiJ'lJ
in interstate commerce. The company filed suit in t"1e Court

or Common

Pleas la Ohio, alleliDl tbat t.be wdon'a conduct constituted a common law
ecmspirac:y as well aa a statutory and common.. law restraint of trade. It
PI'.,... tor temporary aDd permaoem iajWlCtiona.

The union brwCbt proceecl1np to "move the cas. to the

u.

~.

Ill_tel

COUl"\" claiming that the emplo,ar t • peuUon a11eled facta br1natng the c _
within the or1ginal jur18d1et1oa of the Dietrict

court aa a civil aetion ar1ainl

under tile Taft-Ban1e,. Act. Tile 11 "1"81 DJatl"iot Cwrt remanded the acUon
1

to the state court on the fIJ"OUPAil that it~ as tbe \Inion contended- the complaint
111 effect aUepd a Ylolaiion of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of U. Taft-Hartley Act. uDCle!

tbe decision of tbe Garner eas••

cml7 the NLRB had jurisdiction of its

$Ubject

i

matter.

Upon sending the ease back to the state court. the un:ion invoked the

~--------------------------------------------------------~

I

ground taken by the District Court in denyine its jurisdiction. in a motion to
dismiss the action in the state co1D't.

tile same Diatrlot Court seeklrC
ployer to witlldraw the action

aD

Tbe union then tlled a CQrnpla10t in

iDjuncUon wbich would require the em'"

CQmJDellCClG

in the state court. The UJlioD con-

tended thnt the District Court had jurisdiction

b~

on

a8

U. S. c. 11131.

which centers juriad1ctlon on federal courts over an) ciVil a.elton .,ri.iDa
under

~ Act

of CODg••• rep1atma iDler.tate commerce. The Federal

Distrid Court held under 38 0 .. S .. C. 11283 of the Judicial Code 80. wb1cll

without power to vnnt the requestecl relief, inasmuch.a the action did DOt

C!Ome within any or the exceptions to that leneral prohibition.
The Court of Appeala a.tf'traled the Diatriet Count. eleeiateD.

then

CRlJ).8

The ease

before the SUpn1'M CO\U'1 of the Ul11ted aatea.

The tssue that was to be decided before the Court was whether a federal

court may. before
request of

ODe

Ii

complaint has been entertained by the NLaB and at the

of tbe private parties. enjoin the attempt to secure rulief

throuih state proeeftd1naa. The majority of the Court held that the Federal
District Court has no jurisdiction 01 univn's suit to enjoin employer trom p

90~<:Uon &283 state.: Ifj~,- court of tho United states may not crant an injuAcUoD to
proceediDp in a State Court except as expresal,. authoriaed
by an Act of Conares., or where nece••ary in aid of ita jur1acUction, or to

at.,.

protect or effectuate its judgments. U

I

,!

86
eeeding in

~.

stn:te court before a eompbdnt hCi$ been entertained by the NLR

The Cou};"t !n tbis

tic..

ea$~

argue. in technicalities and not with logic or jus-

The Court, through MI'. Justice f>'rwUd'uner. m.akes a diatinction be ...

tween a private paMY and the NaUonal Board aaki.na for injunctive relief.
Tbf.s waS obviously mentioned so that the Court would nt.>t ,0 contrary to the

Capital Service case which satd that a F'ederal District (.Qurt. oD.applieation
of the National Board could enjoin peutioners from eu!'(.)rchla aD injunction
j

already obtained from a State Court. Here Mr. JustiCEt Frankfurt... obvi..
oualy followed tithe 1etter n but not

lithe

apu-it H of the law. He ,aves what

aIIlounta to purely technical reasons tor his conelusiot1s. The Court con..

IIResort to a state court may not be c:1rcumwnted by the
power of the Board to entertain such a complaint. A-penum"
bra! region must remaJ.n between state and federal au1Dority
touching indu8trlal re1atlona untJ1 fJ.Dall:y clarified by .tmtte
rulings ~nd untn tJl!.s is done state litigation must be itllowed

to run its courlSe.

nijl

Thb! conclusion by the court is exactly what the author belleves will

aOOMr or later lead to industrial and

gov~rnmftntal

strife. It is against tile

whole object of tht.'I the$is. Justice Frankfurter talks about definitive rul...

Ing., and what.. may 1 uk u& the Garner and Laburnum ea,MS. These two
~ ...

91

lPW!

348 U. S. 517"

".

4

87

eases, in the author's opinion, act as definitive rulings until amendments
to the LMRA are initiated.

It is the author's opinion that there is no explanation for this ruling excapt that it must be remembered tbat Mr. Justice Frankfurter has repeatedly
asserted that the states must be permitted to apply local poliCieS in the ab..

senee of a clear manifestation of the intent of Congress to pre-empt the field.
It does not I!dawnll on Justice Frankfurter that reeent decisions have ests.b-

l1shed the fact that Congres. has shown its intention to occupy the field of labor relations.

lUSO

Mr. Justice Frankfurter does not realize that rarely

has Congress devoted such attention to the question whether and to what ex ...
tent its legislation should supersede state law.

For instance, a suggestion

was made during the course of debate in the Bouse that the Act should contain
a provision preserving the constitutionality of state laws in the field of labor
relations. But when Congressman Case of South Dakota replied that to preserve "State rights" in this field would "nullify much of the Bill", the sugges"

tion was immediately abandoned and was never brought to a vote. 92 /\nd as a
result of its awareness of the problem and its intention generally to pre-empt

the field, Congress took care to reserve to the states in clear-cut terms thos

92U. S. Congress, HOuse, House Joint ~esolutio:n 3020, Coop-ossiona!.
80th Congo 1st Sel5s., ViednesdGY. ;: pril Hi, 1947, Vol. 93. f1. m,
Washington, 1947.
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areas in which it

desir~d

state regulation to be operative.

It appears to this author that the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice
Warren and Mr. Justice Black and Douglas is the better one. It disregards
technicalities tor justice. The majority opinion in reading Section 2283 literally ignores not only the legislative history but also over a century of
judicial history. which came to a culmination in the Garner case.
The logic of Chief Justice Warren is to be condoned when he says.

"The Board, although clearly having jurisdiction of the
subject matter cannot adjudicate the dispute as long as the
employer does not file an unfair labor practice charge; and
the employer has no incentIve to do so as long as the state
court injunction is outstanding. 1193
The idea

ot justice is also present in which Mr. Justice Black has to say:

IlToday's decision allows state courts to intrude in a
domain where Ule federal. agencies. i. e •• NLRB and Federal
District Court, have been granted primary and exclusive
jurisdiction, without leaving the aggrieved party any effective remedy.
"Where Congress has made clear that federal 9.gencies
have exclusive jurisdiction of a controversy. that legislation
should be taken to qualify 12283 pro tanto.
"If a iedersl court first takes possession of a res. it may
protect its control over it, even to the extent of enjoining a
state court trom interfering with the property. 1I94

----------------93tbid, 348 U. S. 520.

9~lbldi 348 U. S. 524.
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i~nd

the remarks of Mr. Justice Black are just as enlightening:

"There can be no appeal to this Court from the temporary injunction. It may take substantial time in the trial
court to prepare a record to support a permanent injunction.
Once one is granted. the long. drawn-out appeal through
the state hierarchy and on to this court commences. Yet,
by the time this court deCides that from the very beginning
the state court had no jurisdiction, as it must under the
Garner case:. a year or more has passed; and time alone
has probably defeated tbe union claim.
t1That course undermines thefederal regulation; it
emasculates tbe federal remedy; it allows one party to a
labor-management controversy to circumvent the law whicb
Congress enacted to resolve these disputes.

liThe federal regulatory scheme. cries out for protection
against these tactics of evasion. lI9S
And Mr. Justice Black concludes that private parties as well as the
Board should be able to seek the protection of the federal court, especially
in view of the

Q~~~_~

decision where there was no distinction between pri-

vate and public rights.
The author believes that the dissenting opinion is the correct one in view
of the field that we are dealing with. In other fields, where buman beings
are not the primary objects of discussion. technicalities may be the guidepost for decisions. But in the field of labor relations. where every act or
judgment affects millions of people, the guidepost should be justice, fairness

--_'_._--..
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and uniform treatment of all.
We have come a long way in our analysis of cases - from Allen-Bradle)
to ltichman Brothers.

That span has covered approximately thirteen years#

and in these thirteen years the Supreme Court bas upheld federal supremacy
over the field of industrial relations and has given its jurisdiction to the
federal govermnent# even thouah at times it has oscillated and even changed
completely its mind.

'rhus. through the Garner decision the field of labor

relations has been revolutionized so far as state jurisdiction 18 concerned not as much as some would have us believe, but more than others care to

admit.

CHAPTER VII
A SYNOPSIS OF THE LAW

It would be wise at this point to have a short synopsis of the law pertain-

ing to federal and state jurisdiction under the National Labor Relations Act,
which was analyzed in the last chapter.

The author will attempt to give the

law as it exists today under certain categories such as (1) Representation
cases; (2) Jurisdiction over protected or prohibited activities; (3) Jurisdiction over activities which are neither protected nor prohibited; and (4) Jurisdiction where the NLRB refuses jurisdiction. Under each of these categories where the law 11 not certain, or where the Supreme Court has not
handed down a decision on the particular subject matter. the author will
give his opinion on what the law should be on the basis of past Supreme Cour
decisions and common sense.
I a£;PRESENTA TION CASES

One of the most important areas in labor regulation is the selection of

proper collective bargaining representatives. Consequently, it is of

extrem~

importance that jurisdiction in this area be sharply delineated so that in the
first instance the proper lovernmental agency -

either state or federal -

will take juriSdiction an.d a final decision be quickly made. It is not surpris-
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ing. therefore, that the permissible scope of state regulation was first deU.neated in this area.
Thus~

in the LaCrosse case the Court held that the field of representa-

tion is such a "sensitive and dellcate oneil that the power to enforce the poU"
cy of Congress must be singular and exclusive.

Therefore, this field of jurisdiction over representation cases was held
;1,1

to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Board because there is

'

an ever present possibility that state determination In representation proceedings will conflict with that of the NLRB even when the state is applying
a law ostenalblyldenUcal with the National Act.

II JURISDICTION OVER PROTECTED OR PROHIBI'l'£D
ACTIVITIES

The Garner case decided without any doubt that the NLRB has exclusive
jurisdiction over activities which are either protected or prohibited by the
NLRA as amended. However. there were limitations put on the Garner case
by the L~burnum decision.

The law in this field now seems to be that if the

federal government provides a remedy then the state should not be able to

I,
"

,

provide for the same remedy; and it there is a federally !tprotected" right
or an action "probibitedll by the lederal Act. then a state court cannot be
allowed to take any action which would detract or destroy this federally
','I,

'I'I~'
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"protected ll right, or pass legislation which would permit acts which are
forbidden by the feder,tl Act. However, the Laburnum decision made a d1$-

tinction between
damages.

OJ.

state court granting

tln

injunction Qnd granting money

According to the Laburnum decision, the former would run

directly counter to the Act while the latter would not interfere with the
Na.tional Board's control over the subject matter, since Congress has
neither provided nor sugaested any substitute for the traditional state court
procedure for collecting damages for injuries caused by tortious conduct.
Thus. it would seem that a common... law tort action tor damages is an excaption to the Garner ca.se.
Theretore, the principle that there should be no chance of conflict so as
to deprive a person of bis rights under the federal Act 1& upheld. However,
tor the principle to be upbeld there must be a. procedure set-up by the federa11:~ ct: a.nd when there Is no procedure or remedy set-up. the states will be

·1

allowed to apply their traditional remedies, e. g. liability for tortious conduct.
UI JURISDICTION OVER ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE
NEITl'll:i!R PROTECTED NOR PROHIBITii:D

The delineation of the permissible scope of state regulation of activities
which are neither protected nor prohibited by the lederal lew is one of the

most difficult and controversial problems arising under the Taft-Hartley Act. ',,'
I,
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Presumably the NLRB cannot take jurisdIction in this area. There is no indieation,

however~

ot a legislative intent either to gIve jurisdiction to the

state. or to reserve the unexercised power to the federal goverru:n.ent. How . .
ever. such cases as the

Bri"s-stratto~

and t\lgoma bave decided that the

state ean reguia.te any actiVity which 1s neither "protected ,I nor prohibited"
by the federal Act.

Thus, there are three general categories that the states

may regulate - (1) Wegal Strike Action; (2) Picketing which is neither protected nor prohibited; (3) Power to enjoin violations of Collective Baraaining
Agreements.

In regard to the third area - Power to enjoin violations of Collective

Bar,ainiD, AlP'eements - it has not been deelded who haa jurisdiction. In
the preliminary draft of the Taft-Hartley Act, a proposal that the breach of

a coUective bargaining agreement be an unfair labor practice was eonai.dere
and rejected. 96 Instead, a. prOvision was made for suit in the federal court.

Therefore, the parties may only collect damages. This remedy isi however,
of little practical significance.
In favor of state jurisdiction over breaches nf collective bwgaining

96House Report, No. 510, Conference Conunittee~ Both Congress. 1st
Session, June 3, 1947, P. 41 .. 42.
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coUective b;;i.rgaining aereement and that the Norris- La"

precludes this romedy in the federal couru. Perhaps, how-

ever, the unitorm application of an inadequate remedy (which can be improved upon)" is preferable to desperate regulation by tbe states.
But no matter into whose jurisdiction it m ..vr tall. . "sanctity of contract"
must be upheld, tor if it is not then the collective bargainill& &p-eement becomes meaningless und of no value. 115anctity of contract is the pillar of
our CttpitalisUc system and if it is not upheld, the field of ind.ustrial 1'e1&'"
tions will soon crumble.. Therefore. what tbia writer has said in the above
paraaraph does not seem as weU-founded aa it first appears. Thus. 1mprovement in tile federal remedy is definitely in order.
However. in the first two cateaor1.1S - ille,al strikes and picketing
which are neither protected nor prohibited - it would seem that state rsgu-

lati()t1 is the best solution. If the states were uot allowed to regulate, for

example. violent picketing" such p.icketina would aeon come to be a "no-

I

III

I,',

man'a-land" in the field of labor relaUons"smce lenerally it is neither

, I

Ii

'tproteetedll nor "prohibited! by the NLfL\ as ar":mded. The NLRB therefore

", '

could not regulate it. Thus .. neither state nor federal regulation would be
allowed and aets which are not right either morally. ethically or in justice
would be allowed to run wild.

L ________________________________....

ii'I"
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IV REFUSL,\L ali' JURISDICTION BY NLRB
In order to reduce its case load, the NLRB can theoretically cede jurIs-

diction to state labor relation boards. However, in order to do this the pro"
visions 01 the state and federal aCh) must be parallel in all respects and this
is, generally speaking, not the ease.

Also because of the financiallimita-

tions upon the NLRB, the Board will refuse jurisdiction. Thus, when the
NLRB refuses jurisdiction. some of the states have assumed jurisdiction
over the subject matter.

Under this area the !!potential conflict" argument may be advanced
against state

juri5d1etion~

However. in this field also a "no-man's-land"

may be created if the states do not step in. Congress bas plain!,. shown an

intent that certain activities shc:nud be regul.-ated.. and if the states do not
step in when the NLRB refused to do so, they wID not be regulated at all.

Therefore, this then is roughly how the law under each of these categories exists today. some of it clear and some of it ambiguous, a.nd still in some

areas unproclaimed.

CHAPTER VW

CONCLUSION
If one proposition can be advanced concerning the field 01 the law desig-

nated u 1I1abor relations fl with any degree of certainty. it is that no prinei"
ples or rules are so 1ntluential and bindio, to such an elrtent that they can
be assumed to control any new situation that may artse. Where the problem

also presents the question of pre-emption of the jurisdicUon and power of
the state courts, the field. already' confused by widely divergent views of

social philosophy, becomes supercharged with stron, and deep-seated differ ..

ences of political philosophy. The results which can flow from such a combi
nation of conflicting conVictions when considered in terms of judicial opinion
defy prediction.

Hence, the most zealous advocate must restrain any ten-

deney to suggest the principle controlling any situation untU the highest court
has laid down the rule in the case and has charted a clear... cut and weU... defined. course. For this reason the conclusions will be mostly tentative and

opinionative except where the Supreme Court has spoken. In the latter in-

stance, the conclusion wID be concrete and authoritative.
From what has been said in the past seven chapters there are certain
concrete conclusions concerning state jurisdiction. 'It appears from the

:111
,1'1

I'
, !

ca.ses we have analyzed that the states may now act in the field of interstate
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labor relations only in the following situations:
(1) To properly exercise its police power in regulating the mechanics
of labor relations such as preventing breaches of the peace in strikes.
(2) Where. as a matter of pubUc policy# the Court determines that the

complaint, or issue of the controversy is not essentially a labor dispute.
(3)(a) Where the NLRA specifically permits the state to act (This is

limited to Sections lO(a) and 14(b».
(b) Where suits for damage are predicated upon rights created by the
LMRA, Section 303(a).

(4) On the authority of the Laburnum case, the state courts now have
jurisdiction to decide dam ,Ie suits based upon common law torts.
There are conclusions that may be drewn with certainty and rightly so.
Clearly. it is desirable for the states to regulate in some areas - where
speed 1s essential for justice, where regul?tion is desir<:i.ble but the NLHB
has no jurisdiction and where there 1s

R

larger effect on intrastate commerce

and only a small effect on interstate commerce.

It is important, however.

to limit state jurisdiction to cases falling within one of these categories so
that in so far as possible labor relations will be subject to uniform regulation.
As the author sees it, the main conflict between State and Federal jurisdiction COmes from the fault of t.he P,ct itself.

i,

There are certain things in
'I
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the A,ct or in the policy in carrying out the Act which cause conflict between
the jurisdictions. 'l'berefore, the following suggestions are offered to cor-

rect

t~ja

defect.

(1) The initial chan,. to be brought about should be a re-definition of,

or use .. some other term than Itaffecttns commerce' in fixing the scope of
the Act. A term such as tl pl ac1.ng a substantial burden upon commerce ll
would restore to the federal ,overnment and the states the spheres which

have been traditionally the1rs. This would preserve the basic goal of the
I',ct - to estabUsh labor relations on a unlform. national basis.
(J) Either Congress should expros8ly exempt from the operation of the

Act certain traditionally loeal industries, e. g ... hotellndustry. building and
construction, taxicabs, and privately owned public utilities, or if Congress
does llot exempt them- the NLKS should not be permitted to decline juris-

diction.
(3) A more expreaa standard should be used in the regu1s.t1011 of hlbor

relations disputes concerning wages, hours and other work1n1 conditions.

The standllrd could be on the basta of the number of employees and the annu ..

a1 payroll of the particular emP!07er. with a minimum standard set 1n both
instance... 'I'his would be a more realistic approach than basing a standard

on such a nebulous term as !laffect.1ng interstate commerce", as tbe.:"ct now
does ..
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(4) The NLRB should be compelled to accept or decline jurisdiction of
a case within a fixed time, e. I. # one week. Failure to accept within the
fixed period. should be deemed a declination. A controvers7 once declined
should be subject to state action.

However I it, in declining jurisdiction, the

NLRB affirmatively stated that its action in the particular case was in the
best interests ot accomplishlnl the objectives of the !\ctl it should be assumed that the Board had accepted jurisdiction.
(5) Once Congress has fbced the boundaries of the Board's jurisdiction,

it should recognise its obl1ption to implement enforcement of the 1-.. ct by
appropriation ot a budget sufficiently large enough to enable the Board to
fully administer the law.
(6) Cooperative action between the liu,or boards
National Board, e.

a.,

at the states and the

close liaison should be established between the

National Board and the state boards for tile handling of any questions ot can"
flicts of jurisdiction - joint review the eases of conflict.
!II

(7) State legislatures should conform their laws to the National law •

I.
I·

I'

Iii

Such items as anti"communist affidavits. free speech guarantees. specitica-

tiOll of the duty of a union to bargain collectively. and fiscal and financial

policy provisions should be made uniform.
These suggestions are for the purpose of m1n1mizing jurisdictional eonfilets.

It is duly 'Subnlitted that amendment of the NLR/\ and LMR..:\ as

sug~
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gasted above would eliminate most of the abuses that have arisen since the
ldlen-Br;adley case and, at the same time. retain sufficient federal control

over lebor relations with a uniform policy, without undue encroachment up'"

on state sovereignty.
We have argued in this thesis tor a large- area of exclusive federal (.1.uthority in order to permit the development of a unified labor relations program. not only by t..'le NLRB in administering the present statute but also by
the Congress in improving the law.

In v1ew of practical administrative difficulties with which the Board is

faced, opportunity and responsibility for effectuating Congressional policy
in so far as "pre"emption ll and "conflict" matters are concerned must rest
l~.rgely

upon state courts and private parties. If the flpre-emption£l policy is

given elfect in tbe spirit of the "Supremacy Clausell, it wlll# as Congress 1ntended that it should, aid in reducing federal-state jurisdictional conilicts

J

s.nd point the way to desirable improvements in federal law in the field of

Inbor-manasement relations. On the other band, to paraphrase the SUpreme
Court's decision in the LaCrosse ease. state court decisions which promote
uncertainty us to whether the federal government or the state is master
"ean be as disruptive of peace between vnrious industrial factions lf as actual
competition between the federal government and the states for supremacy.
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